
Wayne State University Dissertations

1-1-2010

Transnational Political Participation Among Diasporic Migrants

Amanda Hanlin
Wayne State University

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/oa_dissertations

 Part of the [Political Science Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Hanlin, Amanda, "Transnational Political Participation Among Diasporic Migrants" (2010). *Wayne State University Dissertations*. Paper 164.

This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Wayne State University Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.

TRANSNATIONAL POLITICAL PARTICIPATION AMONG DIASPORIC MIGRANTS

by

AMANDA HANLIN

DISSERTATION

Submitted to the Graduate School

of Wayne State University,

Detroit, Michigan

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

2010

MAJOR: POLITICAL SCIENCE

Approved by:

Advisor

Date

DEDICATION

For my mother.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Special thanks to my husband, family, friends and professors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DEDICATION	ii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	iii
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
LIST OF FIGURES.....	ix
CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION.....	1
CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW	15
Modern Migration	18
Evolving Transnationalism.....	21
Transnational Communities and Diasporas.....	25
Transnational Politics.....	29
The Role of the State	33
Summary of Theoretical Underpinnings.....	39
CHAPTER THREE – THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY	40
Research Hypotheses	41
Defining a Mixed Methods Approach.....	42
Population and Sampling.....	44
Definition of Variables and Measures	45
Instrumentation.....	50
Procedure and Timeframe.....	51

Data Analysis Plan.....	53
Validity.....	55
Methodological Challenges	56
CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH POPULATION	58
Population Demographics	59
Migration and Citizenship.....	64
Interactions with Country of Origin.....	69
Civic and Political Participation	71
CHAPTER FIVE – CONFLICT GROUP SENDING AND RECEIVING STATE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION	79
Sending and Receiving State Activity Comparisons	80
Comparing Conflict Group Political Participation Scores	88
Summary of Results.....	91
CHAPTER SIX – COMPARING PARTICIPATION BETWEEN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT GROUPS.....	97
Political Indicators	98
Comparing Conflict and Non-Conflict Group Political Participation Scores.....	105
Summary of Between-Group Results	106
CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS.....	111

Citizenship and Repatriation	117
Future Directions	120
Appendix A – Hypothesis One Correlation Tables	122
Appendix B – Hypothesis Two Correlation Tables	127
Sending State Political Issues are Important to Me.....	127
Sending State Foreign Policy is Important to Me	127
Appendix C – Instrumentation.....	128
Appendix D – Study Recruitment Materials	140
Appendix E – Participant Information Sheet	146
Appendix F - Human Investigation Committee (HIC) Documents	148
REFERENCES.....	149
ABSTRACT.....	160
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT.....	162

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1-REMITTANCE FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2002-2007 (\$ BILLIONS)	35
TABLE 2 - DEFINITION OF DEPENDENT VARIABLES	47
TABLE 3 – PARTICIPANT AGE AT INTERVIEW	60
TABLE 4 – PARTICIPANT AGE AT MIGRATION.....	60
TABLE 5 - PARTICIPANT LEVEL OF EDUCATION	61
TABLE 6 - PARTICIPANT EDUCATION LEVEL COMPARED TO U.S. FOREIGN-BORN AND NATIVE.....	62
TABLE 7 - PARTICIPANT EMPLOYMENT STATUS PRE- AND POST-MIGRATION	62
TABLE 8 - PARTICIPANT INCOME COMPARED TO GENERAL U.S. POPULATION	64
TABLE 9 - PARTICIPANT IMMIGRATION STATUS AT ARRIVAL IN U.S.....	65
TABLE 10 - PARTICIPANT REASON FOR RELOCATION TO U.S.	68
TABLE 11 - FINANCIAL REMITTANCE FREQUENCY.....	71
TABLE 12 - POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND ISSUES MOST IMPORTANT.....	74
TABLE 13 - PARTICIPANT VOTING BEHAVIOR.....	74
TABLE 14 - FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTION TO CANDIDATES AND/OR PARTIES.....	76
TABLE 15 - INTERACTION WITH POLITICAL FIGURES.....	77
TABLE 16 - METHODS USE TO INFLUENCE POLITICAL OPINIONS	78
TABLE 17 - MEANS USED TO GATHER POLITICAL INFORMATION (CONFLICT GROUP)	82
TABLE 18 - CONFLICT GROUP MEAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCORES (RECEIVING STATE).....	89
TABLE 19 - CONFLICT GROUP MEAN POLITICAL PARTICIPATION SCORES (SENDING STATE).....	90
TABLE 20 - HYPOTHESIS 1 POLITICAL INDICATORS SUMMARY	91
TABLE 21 - SELF-IDENTIFIED SENDING/RECEIVING STATE ACTIVITY (CONFLICT GROUP)	92
TABLE 22 - MEANS USED TO GATHER RECEIVING STATE POLITICAL INFORMATION (BETWEEN GROUP)	99
TABLE 23 - MEANS USED TO GATHER SENDING STATE POLITICAL INFORMATION (BETWEEN GROUP).....	99
TABLE 24 - METHODS USED TO INFLUENCE U.S. OPINIONS (BETWEEN GROUPS).....	102

TABLE 25 - METHODS USED TO INFLUENCE SENDING STATE OPINIONS (BETWEEN GROUPS).....	103
TABLE 26 - POLITICAL ACTIVITY IN THE SENDING AND RECEIVING STATE (BETWEEN GROUPS).....	104
TABLE 27 - SUMMARY OF POLITICAL INDICATORS (BETWEEN GROUP)	106
TABLE 28 – SELF-IDENTIFIED SENDING STATE ACTIVITY (BETWEEN GROUP).....	106

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1: Mixed Methods Model.....	43
------------------------------------	----

CHAPTER ONE - INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, transnational practices conducted by Haitian immigrants had a profound effect on the tumultuous transition of the Haitian government. In his efforts to foster the *ti legliz* movement, Jean-Bertrand Aristide essentially reshaped notions of territorial citizenship and political participation. As Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998: 135) write, "...Aristide broke with classic definitions of the bourgeois democratic nation-state in only one sphere – he redefined the location of state so it was no longer confined within the territorial boundaries of Haiti." Guarnizo and Fouron (1998) "define their...emigrating populations as part and parcel of their nation states" (131)

In his *Lavalas' Project of Government*, a document Aristide published during his presidential campaign, he overtly recruited Haitians living abroad to support his movement. In doing so, he reshaped his political power to encompass all native Haitians, regardless of where they might reside. In order to institutionalize these overtures, Aristide actually met with members of the Haitian diaspora and publicly claimed that they were, "no longer outside of Haiti although living abroad." (Richman, 1992; Jean-Pierre, 1994; as cited in Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:136) By actively seeking assistance from the diaspora, Aristide garnered widespread support during his time of exile. This had several key political effects: (1) Haitians living abroad lobbied their home government in an effort to restore Aristide to power; (2) Haitians living abroad attempted to influence their family and friends living in Haiti to pressure the

Haitian government; and (3) Haitians living in the United States supported Aristide's efforts to gain favor with the U.S. government and subsequently, made efforts to sway U.S. foreign policy regarding Haiti.

Aristide went so far as to appoint a *Chef de Mission* to serve as direct attaché to the Haitian consulate in New York. This only further institutionalized the Haitian diaspora, and cemented its place in Haitian politics although acting from abroad. Haitians in New York were mobilized. They acted on behalf of the Haitian government, even going so far as to demonstrate publicly when one key tenth Department official (Wilson Desir) died. It was an action that amounted to as much as a "state funeral." (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:138)

Efforts within the U.S. receiving communities to mobilize the Haitian diaspora took on a decidedly ethnic flair (Glick Schiller 1975, 1977 and Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998). "The word was communicated through political speeches, patronage, ethnic festivals, invitations to City Hall, and in the case of Haitian organizations, funding from city, state, federal and philanthropic agencies. Haitian immigrants were invited to join the Mayor's Commission on Ethnic Affairs. They were also encouraged to organize support groups for mayoral candidates and to cast their votes for politicians who spoke to the Caribbean immigrant experience." (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998). In these instances, we see the establishment of a transnational political identity that is directly linked to participation in the political institutions of the receiving community.

The use of these mechanisms only escalated. U.S. political candidates went so far as to suggest that to obtain U.S. citizenship and vote in U.S. elections was a means by which Haitian residents of the United States could help influence electoral outcomes in Haiti. (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998)

Although various efforts to incorporate the Haitian diaspora into U.S. and Haitian politics succeeded at further entrenching a sense of interconnectedness with the homeland, there were discursive effects as well. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998) enumerate them as follows, paraphrased here: (1) Homeland dependency on remittances from the diaspora spawned resentment. The homeland Haitians were resentful of perceived prosperity of the diaspora; at the same time, the diaspora grew increasingly resentful of the “burden” of remitting a substantial portion of their income back home; (2) Those who stayed behind in Haiti felt increasingly threatened by the prospect of a repatriated diaspora that had developed an increased professional skill base and language competency since they had departed; (3) Divin over the potential privatization was spot-lighted – diaspora thinks that privatizing utilities in Haiti will allow them better job prospects if they return, and families receiving remittances support this as well. However, families lacking assistance, see this as an expensive development in an already financially stressed existence. They would pay more for less, in a sense.

Politically, the experience of the diaspora came to bear as well. The personal disjuncture described above lead to the creation of political cleavages. (Glick Schiller and Fouron, 1998:153). Economic effects, political leadership, position on policy, etc.

In his study of Haitian migrants, Laguerre (2006) suggests that the diaspora is itself a “transnational political system,” maintained by structures within the homeland and receiving community. He argues that this super-structure allows diasporic refugees to shift their political engagements from the home system to the receiving system, depending on what goals the diaspora seeks to attain throughout its evolution. He writes:

With regard to the role of place or location in diasporic politics, we will see how different relations with different segments of the diaspora depend on the nature of the political process in either site or the projected goal contemplated. A specific diasporic site may be called upon for help by the homeland government to achieve a specific outcome, while another site may be contacted for a different reason. Similarly, a specific hostland government may at times use the services of the local diaspora in its diplomatic and trade relations with the homeland, while at other times it may simply ignore such cosmopolitan political actors.

This process of political bargaining plays out rather simply, although it occurs across a complex plane. Laguerre’s diasporic populations exerted pressure on the Haitian government from their position in their U.S. receiving community. They do this via mechanisms available to them in the receiving community, especially if the receiving community is democratic, such as diplomatic appeals, public demonstration, and mobilization of the diaspora toward some specific political aim. They do this also by communicating directly their efforts and progress back to their social network within the homeland with potential for either positive or negative reaction by the home government. Put plainly, “Diasporic politicians operate inside diasporic organizations,

inside the formal organizations of the sending and receiving states, and within the transnational tentacles of the political institutions of the homeland and the host land. At times, they use one institution (e.g., the Democratic Party in the United States) to consolidate another (the electoral process in the homeland),” (Laguerre, 2006: 3). For example, the Haitian diaspora in the United States actually used their numbers to garner political influence and expertise from US and Haitian officials working within the United Nations and the US government. They later returned to Haiti empowered to form coalitions that could leverage real political change. Laguerre labels this a “transnational stretch of state institution” (2006:3). Others have gone so far as to describe these outcomes of transnational political action as the emergence of some sort of post-state, a sphere of action and influence that transcends both domestic and international political arenas (Basch et al, 1994). In particular, instances of ex-patriate voting illustrate the blurring of traditional political boundaries. Al-Ali (2001) points Eritrean voting numbers during the 1993 Referendum for Independence whereby a total of 84,370 citizens voted while *living outside of Eritrea*.

Sladjan arrived in New York Laguardia Airport at 15 years old, a refugee of the 1990s ethnic conflicts in former Yugoslavia. He maintains both US and Bosnian citizenship. Although he has lived in the United States for 14 years, he keeps close ties with friends and family still living in the Bosnian city in which he was born. He travels to Bosnia and Croatia at least once every year, some years more frequently. Although in his view he does not participate in Bosnian political affairs in any overt fashion, he

admits to using the social networking website Facebook to monitor other Bosnian's views on political events that occur in Bosnia and express his opinions about Bosnian political events. Sladjan explained that he belongs to a "political" Facebook forum called "REVOLT!" Most "REVOLT!" members are young – age 18 to 30, and the majority indicate they live in Bosnia. Discussion threads typically spotlight complaints about the Bosnian government, Bosnian politicians or such issues as community policing and corruption. Sladjan describes REVOLT! as "some sort of a political movement." When I asked him why he takes interest in the group or Bosnian political affairs for that matter, Sladjan replied, "At the end of the day, Bosnia is home. I don't consider myself to be a man of one country."

Edi, an Albanian political asylee, relocated to the United States in 1994. He openly describes himself as "politically active" with respect to issues affecting the Albanian population residing in Southeastern Michigan, and he uses various political channels to affect policy changes that would improve the circumstance of ethnic Albanians locally. However, his political activism transcends local boundaries. Recently, Edi and several of his colleagues wrote letters to their U.S. Congressional representative, requesting that the Member take a stand against the Albanian government's prolonged detainment of two political prisoners. In response, their Congressman sent letters to officials in the Albanian government requesting the prisoners' release. About two weeks after I interviewed him, Edi met with the same U.S. Congressman and a retired U.S. Army General (and former contender for the Democratic Party's presidential

nomination) at an event hosting several thousand ethnic Albanians residing in Suburban Detroit. Discussion topics included the most recent Presidential election in Albania, the Albanian economy, Albania's bid for membership in the European Union (EU), and U.S. immigration and citizenship reform.

Milosh, a twenty-five year old Kosovar refugee, also maintains a substantive connection with his homeland. He explained, "It's basically how I was raised. I have very close ties with extended family, like uncles, aunts, and first cousins. There is also the fact that I've gone so often – I go every summer and stay for extended periods of time, like four to six weeks every summer, so that has helped. And with that...it feels like as if I've never left there." He went on to describe his sense of duality about being from Kosovo but carving out a life in the United States, "A lot of people tell you that they're physically here, but their heart and soul is there. That is how I feel, and it is because of these connections. It does not have to do anything with the U.S. being bad to me or having something done negative to me – it's the complete opposite. I am who I am. Part of it is because I have lived in the U.S., and I've become a better person living in the U.S. But I feel an emotional connection to Kosovo. It is one of the reasons I plan on keeping dual citizenship." Milosh's connection to his homeland also has turned toward the political. He said that he is involved in U.S. political affairs and Kosovar political affairs simultaneously and to the same degree. Interestingly, when I asked him to provide an example of a political action he completed with respect to Kosovar politics, he discussed a U.S. protest he attended on behalf of Macedonian political

prisoners. Milosh explained, “The protest was about wanting a fair trial for Montenegrins suspected of terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism...It was a protest in D.C. We wanted to make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured the Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that were accused, three of which were U.S. citizens.”

I am interested in understanding these political actions as a relevant component of contemporary transnationalism. Ever-increasing international migration rates coupled with enhanced technology and accessible transportation have created a venue for more transnational political action than ever before. Although migrants have always sustained some tie with their homeland, there is more opportunity than ever to commit political actions remotely from the receiving community that have a political effect on structures in a distant homeland. When political actions are committed en masse, as with many diasporas, they can have tangible political effects in both sending and receiving communities. For example, absentee voting and political party contributions from exiles living afar can influence sending state election results. This pattern of affecting political outcomes in absentia holds important implications for our understanding of the bounded nation-state and traditional political structures. As Levitt et al (2003) argue, “Because migrants' local political agency and institutions are shaped not only by local discourses and modes of organization but also by global factors such as rights regimes, traditional ideas about political transparency and accountability need to be revisited.”

More specifically, I am interested in how the presence of conflict in the sending state may or may not affect migrants' ability and desire to act in the political spheres of both the sending and receiving states. Conflict migrants typically depart their homeland as refugees. They leave with little time preparation, scant opportunities to establish support systems to receive them post-resettlement, and often would not have chosen to relocate had conflict not forced them. Ostergaard-Nielsen (2003) writes of the consequences of forced migration. Omitting implications for population size and economic capital, I paraphrase her conclusions: 1.) Forced migration changes migrants' collective self-perception and their perceptions of others, which in turn, influences in- and out-group relations; 2.) Being forced to leave one's homeland creates a new chapter in a culture's shared memories and historical experiences. This shapes the group's "value orientations and behavior patterns." 3) Forced migration effects domestic politics and international relations within and between states. How then does their status as conflict migrants affect political action and outcomes in sending and receiving communities? To which political structure, if any, do conflict migrants belong? And how does their political activism or withdrawal compare to that of migrants who chose to relocate and as such, prepared for their resettlement?

Interstate migration is understood most simply as a human activity resulting in a shift of primary residence from one nation or state to another. But as Sladjan, Edi and Milosh demonstrate, much has changed since the "old" migration of the early Twentieth Century. Levitt et al (2003) explain, "Today, new technologies of communication and

transportation allow migrants to sustain more frequent, less expensive, and more intimate connections than before. Such technologies enable migrants to remain active in their sending communities more regularly and influentially than in the past.” While bifocal existence is not entirely new, increased access to the homeland post-resettlement offers increased opportunity for political action and potential for much more profound results. Additionally, increased tolerance of dual citizenship by both sending and receiving states allows migrants to institutionalize their dual political actions.

Unprecedented advancements in communications and transportation technology have availed today’s migrants the opportunity to trade home for home, place for place. We can gather up-to-the-minute information about faraway places with remarkable accuracy, and if we choose, we can remain consistently involved in the social and political spheres of more than one “homeland.” Truly, individuals are no longer tied to one locality, one set of institutions, and even one legal citizenship status. When contemporary migrants choose to engage in a transnational existence, the possibilities for influence on both home and receiving communities are quite profound. Today’s transnationalism results in transformed identities, new networks, and multi-level social, economic and political action. (Glick Schiller et al, 1992) This challenges our evaluation of contemporary interstate movement and its effects on sending and receiving states. Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 13) write, “...[immigration] theories coined

in the wake of the European's arrival at the turn of the century have been made largely obsolete by events during these last decades.”

Although there is a robust literature reviewing transnationalism, we lack adequate understanding of transnational political opportunity structures, especially for migrants, and the degree to which migrants choose to (or are able to) engage politically in their home and receiving communities, along with any resulting effects on politics in either locale. Additionally, we need to understand that differences in departure and arrival conditions may influence political behavior. The element of force or “involuntariness” that exists for refugees creates a set of circumstances at departure and throughout resettlement that is different than those experienced by other migrants. How might these differences in departure conditions influence migrants' political behavior in their home and receiving communities? Do they choose to participate more frequently in the homeland or receiving community? What other factors influence their behavior?

The field lacks comparative views in this regard as well. Since I am interested in how conflict affects migration experiences and resultant political behavior, I compare conflict and non-conflict migrant activity. I conduct within-group comparisons to examine first whether refugees participate in politics more so in their homeland or receiving community. I then compare political behavior among refugees and non-conflict migrants to assess between-group differences in transnational participation.

Although previous research seeks to understand various social and economic differences between forced and voluntary migrants groups, this is the first such study employing comparative statistical methods to assess differences in political behavior. This is unique also in that I focus on three distinct migration flows from the Balkan region – Bosnians, Kosovars and Albanians who migrated to the United States between 1990 and 2009. I selected these groups for several reasons: (1) They departed the same region of the world within the same time period; (2) I located a U.S. community in which all three groups had established significant enclaves; (3) All groups heralded from post-Communist societies; (4) Conflict in Bosnia and Kosovo displaced people within those jurisdictions during the 1990s. While conflict also affected ethnic Albanians residing in Albania during the Kosovar conflict, conflict did not displace any of the respondents to whom I spoke who had resided in Albania. All of the Bosnians and Kosovars with whom I spoke relocated to the United States with refugee status. All of the Albanian participants (from Albania - excluding those Albanians from Kosovo) entered with immigration status pertaining to work or education.

Migrants occupy different types of political space depending on their migration experience, amount of social capital, and degree of incorporation in both societies. Those migrants who relocate for labor or educational opportunities likely have different assets and attitudes than migrants who were forced to relocate due to conflict. Put simply, I suggest that with respect to political participation, (1) conflict migrants are more engaged in their sending state than in their receiving state; and (2) conflict

migrants participate more in the sending state than migrants whose movement was driven by other factors. In other words, conflict-driven migrants occupy a greater transnational political space than “voluntary” migrants, or those migrants who relocated due to economic, educational other factors typically deemed within their domain. The aspect of choice in relocation suggests that voluntary migrants may be more apt to turn away from politics in the home state in favor of forging a new political identity that compliments their motivations for relocation, be those motivations familial, professional, educational, etc.

In order to ground this effort within an existing theoretical framework, I devote Chapter 2 to reviewing literature conceptualizing globalization, nationalism, and transnationalism. I discuss also transnational communities and diasporas. I then summarize efforts toward understanding transnational political participation and the factors that influence transnational political action. Within this, it is important also to review work highlighting the role sending and receiving states play in determining migrants’ access to political institutions and ability to incorporate in both communities. I conclude Chapter 2 with a discussion of the Haitian diaspora as an illustrative example of contemporary transnational political phenomena. This well-documented case illuminates the complexity of transnational political participation, and provides further justification for my rational and approach. In Chapter 3, I explain my research approach and study methodology, including definition of variables and statistical tests. I devote Chapter 4 to describing the research population. Chapter 5 summarizes results related

to my first hypothesis, and in Chapter 6, I summarize my second hypothesis. In Chapter 7, I review results and place them within the existing literature framework.

CHAPTER TWO – LITERATURE REVIEW

Since 1970, worldwide international migration has more than doubled. According to the United Nations, in 2010 there were approximately 214 million people residing in a country other than where they were born. From 2005 to 2010 alone, the number of international migrants rose by 12 percent, or 23 million people. Most migrants sought shores of more developed regions including European Union (EU) countries, Australia, New Zealand and Japan. But the United States led the pack with a 3.2 percent increase in the number of migrants received every year since 1990. The United States is home to the largest number of international migrants of any country in the world -- some 42.8 million foreign-born residents, or 20 percent of the world's international migrants.¹ Foreign-born residents accounted for nearly 12 percent of the total U.S. population reported by the U.S. Census Bureau.²

Not only is today's migrant flow growing, but it is more diverse than the migrant streams of just 50 years ago. Whereas turn-of-the-century U.S. immigrants were largely from European countries, immigrants now arrive in the United States from every region of the world, from every nation imaginable. Departing both developed and developing countries, today's migrants come forth from a broader spectrum of economic and social circumstances than those who came before them.

¹ United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs/Population Division 17, *International Migration Report 2009: A Global Assessment*

² Luke J. Larsen, *The Foreign-Born Population in the United States: 2003*, Current Population Reports, P20-551, U.S. Census Bureau, Washington, D.C.

Yet amid transition, one constant remains. For as long as people have crossed-borders, so too have they maintained a connection to home. Weber (1978: 388) wrote of “*heimatsgefühl*” – translated literally as “home feeling,” but referring to memories of home. This nostalgia or longing for the “old ways” persists in migrant’s lives long after resettlement, even after repatriation becomes unlikely.

Naturally, most migrants thus experience some sense of duality. This might manifest in frequent trips back to the homeland, support sent to family and friends via financial remittances, and even first-hand participation in political and social life abroad. Contemporary technological innovations foster greater access to information about the homeland, more communication with homeland networks, and new modes of institutional participation. By allowing departed subjects to maintain dual citizenship, many states have softened their borders and redefined political participation structures to include expatriates. Such multi-faced access to the homeland has led to new opportunities for transnational awareness, interactions, activities and identities. As such, our notions of political space and incorporation are ever-evolving. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998) write:

There is something within the experience of being a transmigrant that does transcend borders and boundaries both of the state and of the conceptual terrain mapped by states. To be forced to migrate from your home with a dream of a better life, to confront difficult economic conditions and racism instead of a world of prosperity and security, and to map out transnational connections as a strategy of personal and cultural survival is to enter a realm not totally penetrated by dominant ideas and practices.

What does having a transnational existence mean for migrants' desire and ability to become political actors? Do migrants have opportunities to act politically in one or both of their affiliated communities? And if opportunities are present, do they seek to participate or to withdraw? Truly no two migration experiences are the same. Foner (1997:23) writes, "some groups are likely to be more transnational than others – and we need research that explores and explains the differences. Within immigrant groups, there is also variation in the frequency, depth and range of transnational ties." So, it is unlikely that tendencies toward or away from transnational political activities are the same for all migrants. What are these variances, and what causes them?

Given differences in departure conditions, it stands to reason that migrants who were forced from their homeland may exhibit different political behavior than migrants driven by labor and educational opportunities. Wood (1994) suggests the experiences of forced and voluntary migrants are similar. He includes among their shared challenges, "...declining real incomes, and large personal investments in the migration process; disparities of incomes and opportunities between the place of origin and potential destinations; kinship networks that provide critical information and support; new experiences of ethnic tension and discrimination as an 'outsider'; loss of traditional social status; new educational and language barriers; and weakening of traditional values in the face of powerful, foreign cultural forces." However, I point to differences in financial and social capital, lack of pre-migration planning and preparation and the

trauma of forced migration as factors likely producing a marked difference between conflict and non-conflict migrants.

To explore these ideas further, I first review literature examining migration generally as well as the accepted typology describing different types of migrants. I then conceptualize transnationalism within the context of globalization, and I define transnational communities and diasporas. I review literature discussing transnational political participation, highlighting factors known to influence transnational political participation.

Modern Migration

The essential construct within migration theory is the simple “push-pull” dichotomy (Ravenstein, 1889). Ravenstein proposed that such internal factors as poor economic conditions, political instability, and oppression “push” people to migrate. External opportunities such as better job markets and improved living conditions act concurrently to “pull” people away. Ensuing theory expounds on the push-pull process, laying the framework for contemporary world systems approaches. A neo-classical macroeconomic approach views voluntary movement as the result of a choice between wage differentials in the sending and receiving communities. Put simply, if wages abroad are higher than wages at home, people will feel incentivized to relocate. A neo-classical microeconomic approach suggests that individuals factor more than information about wage differentials into their decision-making process. Likelihood of obtaining employment, cost of relocation, and an individual’s education and skill levels

come into play in the individual's decision to relocate. Invoking Ravenstein, Lee (1966) defined the notion of such "intervening obstacles" as distance and prohibitive receiving state institutions influence migration flows as well.

When voluntary migration occurs, it is a result of optimal choice. In order for optimal choice to emerge, three factors must be present: (1) demand for migrant labor; (2) awareness of demand for migrant labor; and (3) desirable opportunities. (Portes and Rumbaut, 2006: 17) The act of actually relocating internationally is an incredible individual investment. If the move promises a high return on investment, most individuals will take the plunge. Once labor-driven movement is established, other factors begin to incite reciprocal migration. Family ties, entrepreneurial opportunities, and a promise of ongoing economic or social support incentivize additional movement over time.

Richmond (1993) sums up the difference between conflict and non-conflict migration most concisely, writing that voluntary migration is "proactive" while refugee movement is "reactive." As Kunz (1973) points out, the involuntary "push" driving refugees out of their home state creates circumstances that are different from those of other immigrants. These include trauma (mental and physical), loss of contact with key family and social networks, and change in socioeconomic status post-resettlement. The result on refugee psychology includes an incredibly complex interplay of altered history, compromised culture, and political exile.

To summarize so-called migrant “types,” I borrow Portes’ and Rumbault’s (2006: p. 18-33) immigration typology. They propose that contemporary migrants fall into one of the following categories:

- *Labor Migrants* – Labor migrants are contract laborers, seasonal workers, and individuals who, for the most part, are motivated to relocate by the prospect of obtaining a low-skill job.
- *Skilled Professionals* – Skilled professionals are individuals with advanced degrees, often in medical, technical, engineering, and research fields. Whereas we might view labor migrants as driven by unemployment or lack of opportunity, professionals are driven by new career opportunities and the promise of an improved work environment.
- *Entrepreneurial Immigrants* – Entrepreneurial immigrants relocate to reunite with comprise “ethnic enclaves” that have already settled in their receiving community. Entrepreneurs access sufficient capital and labor to sustain a business that, in turn, supports the enclave.
- *Refugees and Asylees* - Refugees and asylees are individuals who relocated “not as a matter of personal choice, but a governmental decision based on a combination of legal guidelines and political expediency.” (Portes and Rumbault, 2006: 31-32) Refugee status is conferred on migrants forced from their home country, while asylees are have already fled their country of origin and cannot return.

I view labor migrants, skilled professionals and entrepreneurial immigrants as belonging to a broad “non-conflict” group. Although certainly migrants represent distinct groups and present a unique set of defining characteristics, their migration was not driven by violent conflict. Likewise, I distinguish refugees as a second research group since their experience was driven by conflict and therefore illustrates sharp differences between non-conflict and conflict-driven experiences.

Evolving Transnationalism

Marx (1848) forecasted that industrial capitalism would “annihilate space,” and new interstate economic relationships would lead to “intercourse in every direction, a universal interdependence of nations.” Wallerstein’s (1974) following world systems theory frames the scope of global capitalism more specifically. He argued that the Western European feudal crisis lasting from about 1300-1450 gave way to global expansion of domestic economic systems. Western European powers pushed beyond their borders, seeking labor supplies in less developed foreign lands. Via colonialism, “core” European powers constructed steadfast economic dependencies between themselves and less powerful “periphery” states. In doing so, capitalism transformed from a bounded domestic economic structure to an international system of complex multi-state interdependence based on interplays between inequality and power. World systems theory thus allows us to examine states as actors on a global plane and a world economy rather than geographically bounded political and economic silos.

These early contemplations ushered the development of modern globalization theory. To paraphrase Basch et al (1994:11-12) and Kearney (1995:548), we can define globalization as a broad set of social, economic, cultural and demographic practices that transcend national borders. Sassen (1998) writes, "a good part of globalization consists of an enormous variety of micro-processes that begin to denationalize what had been constructed as national - whether policies, capital, political subjectivities, urban spaces, temporal frames, or any other of a variety of dynamics and domains."

Globalization has had sweeping effects on the international system. For one, the interconnectedness of labor and product markets provides broader access to consumer goods and labor opportunities. While this increases access to affordable technologies and innovative products, globalization critics note also that it also incites concerns about wage fairness, worker safety, environmental conditions, and the broadening political and economic influence of multi-national corporations. Globalization scholars argue also that increased economic interconnectedness renders states more vulnerable to the effects of economic collapse in far-away locations, since they are increasingly depending on each other for labor, goods and services.

In the scope of this research, I am most concerned with globalization's impact on international migration. Without a doubt, globalization increases movement. It also opens the door for more access to information and various means of communication, meaning that we all have greater exposure to other cultures, languages, and ideas. Globalization encourages transnationalism. With more people relocating, greater ease in communicating back and traveling to the homeland, and increased political and economic cooperation between states, individuals have an enhanced ability to observe and act in more than one location at a time.

Faist (2000) suggests that globalization, nationalism, and transnationalism are three fields entwined, but different. He sums the differences between globalization and transnationalism most concisely by saying that globalization involves "deterritorialized" processes while transnational processes are tied to two or more nation states, and

therefore, not “denationalized.” (Faist, 2000: 210-11; cited also by Kivisto, 2001, 566). Transnationalism is thus related to globalization and migration as a resultant process, but it differs in that it is “anchored in and transcend[s] one or more nation states rather than occurring in a global space.” (Kearney, 1995a: 548; also cited in Mahler, 1998)

Despite globalization’s destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing entities, Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary structure by which we organize and govern. Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as “collective individuals capable of coherent, purposeful collective action.” Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state boundaries. To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual. Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of “transborder nationalisms” as being these “external national homelands” that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of geographic boundaries and legal citizenship. Yet, globalization and transnationalism do challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state. Questions of jurisdiction, overlapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered.

This becomes further complex considering that in contemporary life, an individual’s national associations may change repeatedly over time. Hobsbawm (1990) reminds that states exist only “in the context of a particular stage of technological and economic development.” Just as the state takes on multiple identities over time, it is

possible also to assume multiple national loyalties and affiliations, be they self-ascribed or imposed.

Nina Glick Schiller, Linda Basch, and Cristina Szanton-Blanc. (Glick Schiller, Basch et al. 1992; Glick Schiller, Basch et al. 1992; Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994; Glick Schiller, Basch et al. 1995; Szanton-Blanc, Basch et al. 1995; Glick Schiller and Fouron 1998) contend that contemporary immigrants engage in different social, cultural and political processes than those who came before them. In other words, today's migrants are transnational; yesterday's were not. They argue that migrants of yesteryear became immersed in their receiving communities, and broke ties with the homeland, whereas contemporary immigrants' "...networks, activities, and patterns of life encompass both their home and host societies. Their lives cut across social boundaries and bring two societies into a single social field." (Basch, Glick Schiller et al. 1994)

But transnationalism is not a new phenomenon. While the degree and frequency of interaction with the homeland has changed with the rising tides of globalization, most immigrants have always maintained some sort of tie to the homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances or more structured means of economic and political participation. Portes credits improved communications and transportation technology with paving the way for a viable, accessible transnational space wherein immigrants can interact with the homeland, and to some degree, exert influence within the homeland from their receiving state. (Portes and Rumbaut 1990; Portes 1999; Portes, Guarnizo et al. 1999) Kivisto (2001: 555) and Morawska (1999)

support this contention in later work, making clear that although today's migrants may exist in more defined transnational spaces, past migrants were always connected to loved ones left behind, and financial remittances have long played a heavy hand in shaping interactions between home- and hostlands.

Vertovec (1999) summarizes no fewer than *six* discursive transnationalism themes, paraphrased here: (1) a new "border spanning" form of social organization; (2) a "diasporic consciousness;" (3) a mode of cultural reproduction; (4) a mode of "cultural reproduction" akin to hybridity; (5) a site of dual-state and extra-state political engagement; and (6) a shift from concepts of space that focus on local domains to those that are "translocal" in their reach. I do not find these themes to be mutually exclusive. Transnationalism is at once all of these things with varying intensity. Although atypical, some migrants do not experience a transnational existence at all. For some, transnationalism is a conscious means of staying connected to the cultural, social and political. For others, transnational activity manifests from an instinctual tie to the familial and a yearning for connectedness. However exercised, transnationalism crafts evolving notions of community.

Transnational Communities and Diasporas

Faist focuses on transnationalism as a new social space *between* nation-states that is constructed by transnational processes. Kivisto (2001: 565) summarizes this as follows, "...the idea of transnational space treats the migratory system as a boundary-breaking process in which two (usually) or more nation-states are penetrated and

become part of a singular new social space.” Within Faist’s “transnational space” ideas, cultured, and resources circulating among migrants create transcendent social, cultural, political and economic networks. These networks, comprised of “transmigrants,” become communities in and of themselves. In completing actions between the sending state and the receiving state, transmigrants occupy a unique space. They are simultaneously influenced by more than one system and influential in more than one system.

Glick Schiller et al (1992: 1-2) strike the most oft-cited definitions for contemporary “transmigration” and “transmigrants.” They write,

We have defined transmigration as the processes by which immigrants build social fields that link together their country of origin and their country of settlement. Immigrants who build such social fields are designated “transmigrants.” Transmigrants develop and maintain multiple relations – familial, economic, social, organizational, religious, and political that span borders. Transmigrants take actions, make decisions, feel concerns, and develop identities within social networks that connect them to two or more societies simultaneously.

Roberts, Frank and Lozano-Ascencio (1999:239) suggest then that, “transnational migrant communities’ are groupings of immigrants who participate on a routine basis in a field of relationships, practices, and norms that include both places of origin and places of destination.” Portes characterizes this transnational domain as being somewhat symmetrical -- composed of a growing number of persons who live dual lives in the sense that they speak two languages, own homes in two countries, earn a living

through transactions spanning national borders, and in many cases, maintain dual citizenship. (Portes et al, 1999:217; also see in Kivisto, 2001:560).

This duality extends beyond the construction of interstate transnational spaces as we understand them. Faist's (2000) transnational communities are not limited to territoriality, but rather, reliant on tangible social and cultural bonds. These "communities without propinquity" span more than one nation-state at one point in time. (See also Glick Schiller et al 1992: 11, and Vertovec 1999: 450.) Vertovec (1999) calls these transnational communities "social formations that transcend physical borders," and he suggests there are five conceptual tenets inherent to transnationalism theory: consciousness, means of cultural reproduction, link to capital, point of political engagement and reconstruction of place (See also Al-Ali et al., 2001). Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 9) note the fundamental impact created by altering this space, "...it has enabled the creation of forms of solidarity and identity that do not rest on an appropriation of space where contiguity and face-to-face contact are paramount."

Kivisto (2001:569) elaborates, "...transnational migrants are engaged in activities designed to define and enhance their position in the receiving nation, while simultaneously seeking to remain embedded in a participatory way in the everyday affairs of the homeland community..." Guarnizo and Smith (1998, 21) also view transnational identity formation within a context of "embedding and disembedding." As they put it, "Identity is contextual, but not radically discontinuous. People seek to be situated, to have a stable mooring, an anchor amidst the tempest..."

This desire for mooring may play a role in diaspora formation. As Clifford describes, “loss and hope [are] a defining tension” of all diasporas. Vertovec calls upon earlier work from Sheffer (1986) and Safran (1991) to summarize the “triadic relationship” contained within diaspora as “...globally dispersed yet collectively self-identified ethnic groups; the territorial states and contexts where such groups reside; the homeland states and contexts whence they and their forebears came.” Safran (ibid) highlights defining features of a diaspora, including the occupation of at least two communities outside the homeland, share a common memory of their shared experience and a feeling of expulsion, or at least, a belief that they “cannot be fully accepted by their host country.” Diasporas often envision eventual repatriation, and as such, they become quite involved in homeland projects and continued development of the communities they left behind. Safran concludes that this ongoing involvement with the homeland plays an important role in establishing political identity.

While once a free-standing concept, “diaspora” is increasingly difficult to distinguish from “transnational community.” Vertovec (1998, xvi) explains, “‘Diaspora’ is the term often used today to describe almost any population which is considered ‘deterritorialized’ or ‘transnational’ that is, which has originated in a land other than where it currently resides and whose social, economic, and political networks cross the borders of nation-states, or indeed, span the globe.”

Both transnational communities and diasporas are affected politically by their status as migrants living apart from the homeland. Vertovec (1998, xviii) writes that

their “political interests are often ignited by the “political plight” of the homeland.” However, it is unclear how and to what degree transnational communities and diasporas are affected. In his study of Croats residing in Sweden, Frykman (2001: 169) writes, “...it is yet to be seen whether it [exile] provides a new “enemy” against which diaspora groups might solidarize, or whether they will make diaspora Croats lose interest in current Croatian politics since they feel they cannot affect it anymore.” I conceptualize transnational politics and identity formation further in the following section.

Transnational Politics

The immigration experience has always been wrought with conflict between “old loyalties and new realities.” (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:120) Portes and Rumbault recount how 18th Century Germans tried to “re-create” their nation state via tight-knit ethnic enclaves situated within the United States. Slovaks, Croats and Polish soon followed suit. It was not long before political stakeholders realized that they could levy support from these communities by drawing on their shared status as immigrants to rally them around “common” political issues. Portes and Rumbault (125-126) write, “...ethnic markers, originally used to fragment the working class, were redefined by reactive formation into symbols of pride and rallying points for mass political participation.”

Large corporations and political movements commonly exploited immigrants for political gain. However, as they slowly gained footholds in their new communities,

immigrants leveraged the solidarity of their enclaves. Although frequently manipulated by politicians and corporate interests, enclave leadership quickly learned the power of the “ethnic vote” could further their position in the hostland when tendered in exchange for job opportunities and improved housing conditions. Immigrants also leveraged their solidarity to further homeland agendas. Migrant communities regularly lobbied local, state and federal officials to enact policies directly concerning treatment of their homeland. As Portes and Rumbault (1999: 221) observe, “The stronger these communities became, the stronger their influence on home country politics.”

Transnational political space appears to be increasingly complex. In short, we know that migrants’ affiliations continue to develop after they cross national borders, and we speculate that they develop influential political affiliations in more than one community. Baubock (2003: 705) writes, “...political institutions and practices that transcend the borders of independent states are transnational if they involve simultaneous overlapping affiliations of persons to geographically separate polities.” Political action becomes transnational when it transcends national borders in either action or effect. As Portes and Rumbaut write, (2006: 131) “In many cases, the magnitude, duration, and impact of migration are so strong that migrant social networks mature into transnational social fields spanning the sending and receiving country...[T]hose who live within transnational social fields are exposed to a set of social expectations, cultural values, and patterns of interaction that are shaped by more than one political system.”

As such, transnational political action is multi-level. (Smith, M.P. 1994, cited in Guarnizo and Smith, 1998). It occurs in local and distant milieus. Actions may be the collective efforts of international organizations and multinational corporations or they may be “survival strategies” of transnational migrants. Moreover, transnational space, although seemingly supra-national, is better described as local-to-local than as a space beyond structure. Put simply,

Transnational practices, while connecting collectivities located in more than one national territory, are embodied in specific social relations established between specific people, situated in unequivocal localities at historically determined times...While transnational practices extend beyond two or more national territories, they are built within the confines of specific social, economic and political relations which are bound together with perceived shared interests and meanings. (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998:11-13)

Goldring elaborates further, “...transnational social fields, and localities of origin in particular, provide a special context in which people can improve their social position, and perhaps their power, make claims about their changing status and have it appropriately valorized, and also participate in changing their place of origin so that it becomes more consistent with their changing expectations and statuses...” (Goldring, 1998: 167) this has been shown to lend leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a transnational space more so than the community of origin. In Goldring’s argument, this is especially salient for Mexican immigrants who strive to build a common Mexican political identity from the foreground of the United States, absent the constraints of Mexican authority.

Transnational political structures legitimize themselves by basing connections on shared meanings, efforts to achieve social and political equality, and various processes that may be considered the “political democratization” of transnational space. (Guranizo and Smith, 1998) As is the dual nature of transnationalism, transmigrants’ political identity becomes at once “free formed and socially determined.” (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, 20) Shapiro (1990) observes that in this “post-modern polity” migrants redefine their identity with every movement, and every introduction to new structures and spaces.

These factors shape the political identity of the transnational communities and diasporas. (See Rouse: 1991, Safran: 1991, Clifford: 1994, etc.) Clifford (1994: 304) explains this difference, “Diasporas usually pre-suppose longer distances and a separation more like exile: a constitutive taboo on return, or its postponement to a remote future. Diasporas also connect multiple communities of a dispersed population.” This affects the mode and intensity of the diaspora’s political engagement. Appadurai (1995) writes, “They also involve various rather puzzling new forms of linkage between diasporic nationalism, delocalized political communications and revitalized political commitments at both ends of the diasporic process.” Clifford summarizes this as, “Diaspora cultures thus mediate, in a lived tension, the experiences of separation and entanglement, of living here and remembering/desiring another place.”

Thus, the strings tying transnational communities and diasporas to two communities are drawn taut, and we know that this has some impact on their sphere of

action and influence. How does this affect their political engagement, specifically? What other factors influence political identity formation and resultant action? I review these influences in the forthcoming section.

The Role of the State

The sending and receiving states are paramount in determining the degree to which migrants maintain transnational ties and forge transnational communities. Faist (2000) writes, "Transnationalism calls attention to the cultural and political projects of nation-states as they vie for hegemony in relations with other nation-states, with their citizens and 'aliens.'" It is challenging, and in some instances undesirable, for migrants to break from the state with which they associate their language, culture and personal history. This is even more so the case when transnational activity is sanctioned by the state directly. Drainville (1995, repeated in Drainville 1998) observes,

It appears...that political transformation in the world economy...relies both on the confinement of political and social relationships to the space of national social formations, and on the capacity of states to structure political participation...[International organizations and states have] in effect built a wall around the space [they] are attempting to manage

Homeland/hostland policies determine migrants' array of options to some degree, and thus, migrants' ability to become "incorporated" as full citizens in either locale. (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998, Smith, R., 1998, Ong, 1999). These structural influences hold broad implications for migrants' perception of their place both within and between

state structures. Baubock and Rundell (1998:21) summarize it simply, “From the migrants’ perspective, states come in and out of their lives.”

According to Baubock (2005), there are several reasons states allow expatriate political participation including, maintaining influence via old political ties, the need for financial remittances and foreign investorship (see also in Baubock, 2003 and Itzigsohn, 2000), ethnic nationalism, and at times, some specific motivation by a political party or interest sector. Guarnizo and Smith suggest some sending states maintain tangible ties via “transnational grassroots movements” that foster transnational projects (as initially brought to light by Smith, M.P., 1994) and often launch efforts to reincorporate departed citizens.

Transnational practice is thus not only a result of structural processes and mobility, but sometimes a result of strategic nation-building. Glick Schiller and Fouron (1998: 132) write, “Nation-building is therefore identified as a set of historical and affective processes that link disparate and/or heterogeneous populations together and forge their loyalty to and identity with a central government apparatus and institutional structure.” This is most evident when migration occurs after conflict or state collapse, as is the case with Bosnian and Kosovar diasporas. Baubock (2003: 712) describes this influence on migrant political mobilization, particularly diasporas:

Nation-building processes in the homeland also go a long way towards accounting for variations in transnational political activities between migrant groups of different origins that otherwise show similar pattern of immigration and settlement. While transnational political practices in most cases will be limited to the first generation of immigrants, diasporic

identities can persist over generations among descendants of nations fighting for independence and international recognition. They can sometimes even be reactivated among groups that originally emigrated as labor migrants.

States drive nation-building most notably by institutionalizing financial remittances from departed citizens. According to the 2002 United Nations *International Migration Report*, some states rely on migrant remittances sent back to the home country as a major source of foreign exchange earnings and an important addition to gross domestic product. The World Bank estimates that remittances to developing countries topped \$251 billion dollars in 2007. I abbreviate the World Bank's remittance flow data table in Table One.

Table 1 - Remittance Flows to Developing Countries, 2002-2007 (\$ billions)

INFLOWS	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007
<i>Developing countries</i>	143	163	194	226	251
East Asia and Pacific	35	39	47	53	59
Europe and Central Asia	16	23	32	39	47
Latin America and Caribbean	35	42	48	57	61
Middle-East and North Africa	20	23	24	27	29
South Asia	30	29	33	40	44
Sub-Saharan Africa	6	8	10	11	12
<i>World</i>	206	234	266	303	337

Source: Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, et al. (2008). *Remittance flows to developing countries, 2002-2007 (\$ billion)*. Revision to *Remittance Trends*, The World Bank.

States also encourage political action by adopting citizenship policies that are amicable to transnational practice. Sending and receiving states overtly encourage

transnational political practice when they allow migrants to maintain homeland citizenship regardless of their citizenship status in their receiving communities. In this way, the state actually becomes involved in the transnational space (Glick Schiller et al 1994). Some (Guarnizo and Smith, 1998) suggest that enacting dual citizenship policies inhibits migrants' full assimilation into their receiving community – a policy byproduct that maybe unintentional or strategic, depending on the motivations of the sending state. As Portes and Rumbaut (2006: 18) put it, “....the web of transactions between sending areas and their expatriate communities take over as engines of the movement.”

Some scholars focus on this political duality as a barrier to “properly” enacting citizenship, one that “may result in new geographies in the dynamics and distribution of rights and identities, and patterns of exclusion and inclusion,” (Castles 1999; Soysal 2000). Portes and Rumbault (2006: 120) regard U.S. immigrants specifically as being political. They write, “Depending on the variable geometry of places of origin and destination, immigrant communities may be passionately committed to political causes back home, either in support of or opposition to the existing regime. They may see themselves as representatives of their nation-state abroad, or they may turn away from all things past and concentrate on building a new life in America.”

From the vantage point of the receiving state, immigrants' entry into the political milieu is typically delayed, if it ever occurs. Many immigrants are so preoccupied with finding work, housing and language assistance that establishing one's self as a political actor is simply unfeasible. Early incorporation typically occurs when some exceptional

circumstance is present. In situations where immigrants arrive in their receiving state with a high degree of education, or are barred from ever returning to their homeland, we observe a higher degree of political awareness and agility. (Portes and Rumbault, 2006) The receiving state's policies "...can accelerate social integration and economic mobility, or it can perpetuate social dependence and economic marginalization." (Portes and Rumbault, 2006: 93) Portes and Rumbault identify three potential state dispositions in this regard: "exclusion, passive acceptance, or active encouragement."

Migrants affected by structural economic changes typically leverage their job training, business formation and entry into labor markets as the foundation for social citizenship. Although lacking distinct political entry points, they may integrate "via secondary political rights" allotted them by trade unions, economic development programs, and so on (Miller 1987). Post-conflict migrants, however, likely experience this transnational duality differently than voluntary migrants. Frequently conflict destroyed, or at the very least distorted, old in- and out-group political ties (Wahlbeck, 1999. See also Kelly, 2003.)

Liebich (2007) lays out these complexities within the scope of the Baltic states whose "statelessness lasted longer than statehood." Discontinuous statehood and near constant political upheaval has broad implications for political identity and membership, particularly when the citizenship experiences "anguish at the perspective of the disappearance of one's own people and country." (Bibo 1991 [1946]: 13-69), also see Liebich) Throughout the Eastern European and Balkan states the concept of citizenship

and political boundary is so ambiguous that migrants opportunity structures are constantly changing. Some Baltic states allow citizens to maintain citizenship by birth forever, but some withdraw legal citizenship once the resident departs. Hungary and Slovakia, for example, allow “plural citizenship” out of concern for their diasporas. Liebich (2007: 20) summarizes the state of citizenship policy in Eastern European countries,

...[E]migré pressure in favour of plural citizenship is becoming stronger than ever. First, as a consequence of the fall of communism, these countries have reconciled themselves with their historical émigré communities, just as these communities abroad have reconciled themselves with their countries of origin. Second, these countries are producing a significant new wave of emigration.

Guarnizo suggests that immigrants who have obtained U.S. citizenship are less likely to remain involved in the politics of the homeland. He argues, “Becoming a U.S. citizen should act as a ‘natural barrier’ to the continuation of political transnationalism.” (Guarnizo et al, 2003: 1216). Guarnizo also points to studies suggesting a correlation between a higher degree of educational attainment and a greater propensity for migrant’s political engagement in the receiving community. Pickus (1998), for example, expounds upon the more global literature depicting education as an influence on political participation (Lipset 1960; Almond and Verba 1963; Olsen 1980; Tarrow 1998), suggesting that educated immigrants are actually likely to shift their energy (and in some cases, more material resources) to the political domain of their new home. Within this reallocation, migrants affect change through local development projects, social

associations and active political involvement, which may include financial investment in a cause or initiative (Guarnizo et al, 2003).

Summary of Theoretical Underpinnings

Clearly, there is significant literature evaluating immigration and transnationalism. In general, this literature finds that migrants, regardless of the circumstances preceding their movement and in at least partial contrast to the past, have come increasingly to participate in a variety of dual social, political, and economic processes. Less is known about how migrants' distinct experiences affect their views about homeland and hostland politics, and their propensity to participate on or both political arenas. Moreover, we understand very little regarding how differences in sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the state.

CHAPTER THREE – THEORETICAL APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY

Every migration experience is different, dependent in part on what triggered the migration flow. People relocate for myriad reasons: war, natural disasters, government repression, economic change, and the search for new work and educational opportunities. The circumstances of departure frequently determine the level of physical and social capital available to migrants. There may be an existing housing or employment opportunity, or aid may be available from pre-established family members. Non-governmental organizations may (NGOs) offer support to immigrants and refugees, or assist in obtaining citizenship and institutional support. On the other hand, there may be little by way of assistance with resettlement, language and job training.

We know that migrants can have impetus to exert political influence over structures in their sending and receiving states simultaneously. But little is known about migrants' transnational political action from a comparative perspective. There is insufficient insight regarding whether or not immigrants' conditions of departure correspond to their political participation habits post-relocation. We know even less about how different transnational communities and diasporas compare to others with respect to membership and political participation.

Research Hypotheses

This study analyzes the political actions of three specific migrant groups. It differs from other approaches in that I seek specifically to measure (1) difference in the type and frequency of political participation in the home versus receiving community; and (2) differences in participation between migrants driven by conflict, and migrants who relocated due to non-conflict events and circumstances. I propose two comparative hypotheses:

H_1 = Conflict-driven migrants engage in political activity more so in their sending state than in their receiving state.

Null: Conflict driven migrants exhibit no difference in political participation between their sending and receiving community, or they exhibit less activity in the sending community than the receiving community.

H_2 = Conflict-driven migrants engage in sending state political activity more so than non-conflict migrants.

Null: There is no difference in sending state political participation between conflict and non-conflict migrants.

Toward these aims, I propose the following research questions:

- Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict and non-conflict migrants?
- Is conflict migrants' political participation actively skewed more toward the sending state or the receiving state?
- How is political participation different for conflict-driven migrants versus migrants driven by other factors?
- What are the implications of these differences for the political participation structures in sending and receiving states?

In the sections that follow, I outline my research approach and methodology, including a definition of variables.


Defining a Mixed Methods Approach

In gauging whether conflict migrants take stage as transnational political actors, I rely heavily on the structural foundations in Michel Laguerre's *Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization*. Theoretically, Laguerre relies on globalization as his primary backdrop. I place this study more precisely within the scope of transnationalism research to better explain potential dual-state political activity. I have chosen this theoretical niche because recent research widely concludes that interstate migration is not merely a byproduct of globalization. Refugees develop transnational bonds notwithstanding globalization. (Al-Ali et al, 2001; Moberg, 1996; Shami, 1996)

I diverge from Laguerre methodologically as well. Laguerre examines the Haitian diaspora migration flow without making any in- or out-group comparisons across a set of control variables. Conversely, I examine three distinct migration flows from the same geographic region across a fixed time period. I define a range of dependent and control variables that allowed me to assess differences within and between the conflict and non-conflict groups. That said, I employed a mixed qualitative/quantitative research design, because it allowed for greatest flexibility in data-gathering and analysis within such a diverse and complex population.

At its simplest, mixed methodology is defined as, “Data collection that includes closed-ended items with numerical responses as well as open-ended items on the same survey.” (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998) This allows the researcher to integrate “qualitative and quantitative data in a way that is mutually reinforcing.” (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007) I used a parallel/simultaneous mixed methods design, meaning that I collected qualitative and quantitative data at the same time, (i.e. using the same interview protocol), and I presented qualitative and quantitative results in an integrated fashion. My wish to rely primarily on “hard” or quantitative results primarily is tempered by the fact that my sample size was not sufficient to draw full statistical comparisons in all categories; thus, I use qualitative results to inform the quantitative analysis and illustrate specific cases. Ulin et al (2004) illustrate this model visually, which I reproduce in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Mixed Methods Model



Population and Sampling

The unit of analysis for this study is the individual participant. I limited criteria for inclusion to adults over 18 years old who relocated to the United States from Albania, Bosnia or Kosovo between 1990 and 2009. I focused on this region because all three groups departed the same region of the world at approximately the same point in time. Additionally, including these groups allowed me to draw a basis for comparison considering that the Bosnians and Kosovars were forced migrants and the Albanians relocated voluntarily. I excluded illegal immigrants from selection, because: (1) I was concerned about confidentiality issues that may arise by my documenting interviews; and (2) illegal immigrants do not have full access to political structures, and therefore, it would be inappropriate to include them in a survey accounting for political participation.

Although most desirable, I could not use random sampling for this study. I did not have access to a large enough research population to employ randomized selection techniques that would be truly representative of the population residing in the research area. This is a common problem when studying such specific populations. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998:73) suggest. "When you can't reach the whole population.... It's probably more advisable to select your units non-randomly, based on information you already have about these units." As such, I used snowball sampling, meaning that I drafted an initial list of contacts, and requested an interview from those within study parameters. I interviewed those who consented, and then following the

interview, I asked them for additional contacts. This approach yielded 86 potential participants, of whom 77 fell within my selection criteria. In sum, 36 participants consented to participate in the study. Since all interviews undertaken were 100 percent complete across all participants, I am able to report a survey response rate of 46.7 percent.³

Definition of Variables and Measures

Transnationalism is exceedingly complex. So many micro- and macro-determinants exist that it is very difficult to illuminate all potential influences on participants' behavior. I started by defining an independent variable:

x = Conflict Group Assignment

I assigned participants to conflict/non-conflict groups based on two conditions: (1) known presence of conflict in the sending state at the time of the participants' departure; and (2) the participants' indication that conflict was the *primary* reason they departed the home state. If the respondents expressly indicated that they left due to conflict, then I assigned them to the conflict group.⁴ Over 66 percent of participants experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, while 33.3 percent did not. Based on their responses, all members assigned to the conflict group were

³ This rate was calculated according to American Association for Public Opinion Research (AAPOR) standards for in-person household interviews. http://www.aapor.org/Response_Rates_An_Overview.htm

⁴ This information was gathered using questions 22 and 23 from the interview questionnaire, which I include in Appendix c.

Bosnian and Kosovar, while all non-conflict group members were Albanians from Albania.

Open-ended responses emphasized departure conditions. For example, a 50-year old Bosnian woman said, "...we left our country because of war...But because of war, we also had no job, no education, no life. Put in perspective...with two little children, I really didn't have much of a choice. We ended up here. That means we didn't have a choice. We couldn't stay [in Bosnia]." A 62-year old Bosnian man explained also, "As a result of politics before war and the result of war...My decision for me is that it is better for me to stay away [from Bosnia]. And that is why I came over here..."

Kosovar participants voiced similar experiences. A 46-year old Kosovar woman responded, "[I left] because of war. I never thought I'm going to leave my country, never in my life. I was the one from all my friends who I said I'm never going to leave [Kosovo]." Another Kosovar woman, age 24, elaborated further, "It was the war, and then we found out that our entire property had been destroyed. So we came here – it was the fastest way to get financially stable and see what we could do, whether to return or stay here."

In order to define variables, I first laid out what, in my estimation, were all of the possibilities for participants' political participation:

- Action takes place within receiving state political structures only
- Action takes place within sending state political structures only

- Action occurs within receiving state political framework, but it is centered on issues relevant to the diaspora or with regard to receiving state policy toward the sending state.
- Action involves any combination of the above
- Participant does not act within in any political structure.

Using these assumptions, I turned then to define a set of dependent variables.

These are summarized in Table X.

Table 2 - Definition of Dependent Variables

Dependent Variable	Name	Definition	Points Possible
y	US Citizen	Current U.S. Citizen	None
y ₁	Sending State Citizen	Valid citizenship in sending state	None
y ₂	Political Issue of Import	There is at least one political issue of importance to the participant.	None
y ₃	Political Activity Pre-/Post-Migration	Participants indicate if they were more politically active before or after migration.	None
y ₄	Political Activity in US and Country of Origin	Participants indicate whether they are more politically active in the sending or receiving state.	0-1 per locale
y ₅	Political Issues Most Important	Participants indicate whether sending or receiving state political issues are most important to them.	0-1 per locale
y ₆	U.S. Political Party	Any U.S. political party affiliation, not limited to any specific set of parties	0-1
y ₇	Country of Origin Political Party	Any sending state political party affiliation, not limited to any specific set of parties	0-1
y ₈	Contributes Money to U.S. Political Entity	Frequency of monetary political contributions to U.S. political parties and/or candidates	0-4

Y ₉	Contributes Money to Country of Origin Political Entity	Frequency of monetary political contributions to sending state political parties and/or candidates	0-4
Y ₁₀	Voted in U.S. Election	Voted in one or more U.S. elections	0-1
Y ₁₁	Voted in Country of Origin Election	Voted in one or more sending state elections since migration to the United States	0-1
Y ₁₂	Influence Political Opinions in United States (scored from a list of possible methods)	Number of methods used to influence political opinions of others living in the United States	0-6
Y ₁₃	Influence Political Opinions in Country of Origin (scored from a list of possible methods)	Number of methods used to influence political opinions of others living in the sending state	0-6
Y ₁₄	Gather Information about U.S. Politics (scored from a list of information types)	Number of sources consulted for information about U.S. politics	0-4
Y ₁₅	Gather Information about Country of Origin Politics (scored from a list of information types)	Number of sources consulted for information about sending state politics	0-4
Y ₁₆	U.S. Political Participation Score	Cumulative numeric score on all dependent variables pertaining to U.S. participation	0-20
Y ₁₇	Sending State Political Participation Score	Cumulative numeric score on all dependent variables pertaining to country of origin participation	0-20

I identified as many valid control variables as possible. These included

- Gender
- Sending State
- Ethnicity
- Length of Time US Citizen (in years)
- U.S. Immigration Status at Arrival
- Remittances to Family/Friends (in frequency per year)

- Remittances to Projects (in frequency per year)
- Considers Repatriation
- Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Receiving State
- Parents/Siblings/Friends/Children Residing in Sending State
- Religion
- Highest Level of Education Obtained
- English Ability at Migration
- Current Employment Status
- Current Salary
- Age at Interview
- Age at Migration
- Marital Status

I started out with a slightly longer list of control variables, but in analyzing the data, I omitted several due to various problems. Specifically, I did not feel comfortable using the data I gathered for “Length of Time to Obtain Citizenship.” Many of the participants could not remember with accuracy how long the process took, especially in light of the five-year Permanent Resident requirement. Some participants factored that period into their estimate, and some did not. So, I disregarded the variable.

I also observed inconsistency in measuring voting behaviors. I had originally set up the questions to gather the number of local, state and federal elections for which each participant had cast a vote. But a significant number of participants could not recall with certainty. Instead, I measured whether or not the person had ever voted in an election in the sending and receiving states since the time of migration.

Although I was able to gather participants’ current “Employment Status” and “Annual Income,” I decided not to use the data I gathered for their employment status

and income prior to leaving their home country. For one, the conflict participants had experienced so much displacement that few of them were employed at the time of departure, although most of them had been employed all of their lives. Since I had asked for income within an ordinal scale, every participant reported an annual income under \$25,000 USD. I asked participants for more specific estimates of income, but they were essentially trying to calculate an income based on historical exchange rates to USD, and it seemed very unreliable. Additionally, since there was so much economic strain in Albania, Bosnia and Kosovo during the mid-1990s, it was almost impossible to understand what income would mean as far as socioeconomic status or purchasing power.

Other variables proved to be insufficient controls, because nearly the entire survey population exhibited the characteristics being measured. These included whether the participant's hometown was urban or rural, whether the participant had lived in US since migration, and property ownership in the sending state.

Instrumentation

Using my variable set as a guide, I designed an original interview protocol to survey the population demographically and construct questions to measure political participation in the sending and receiving states. The protocol contained 57 closed- and open-ended queries, some of which had additional follow ups and probes. The interviews ranged in length from 17 minutes to 112 minutes. The interview protocol is available in its entirety in Appendix A.

Procedure and Timeframe

The Wayne State University (WSU) Human Investigation Committee (HIC) Internal Review Board (IRB) approved all of my recruitment materials for distribution. In working with various community organizations to gather my initial participant contact list, I found that many Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars in Metropolitan Detroit speak English fluently. However, I hired translators to prepare cross-language materials in Bosnian and Albanian to ensure I did not exclude any consenting participant due to a language barrier. An initial translator made all of the translations from my English materials into Albanian and Bosnian. To check validity, I asked a second translator (who had never seen the English materials) to translate the Albanian and Bosnian materials back into English. I reviewed these results to ensure the integrity of the questions and their meaning.

To recruit participants, I first established a base of initial contacts drawn from university affiliations, student organizations, cultural groups, faith-based organizations and businesses with distinct affiliations with Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars. I mailed (or emailed) each person a cover letter and two recruitment flyers – one written in English, and one written in participant's native language. I also left recruitment flyers and local businesses and libraries, and I distributed some at community meetings where I felt I might make contact with eligible participants. I include recruitment materials in Appendix B. After the letters and flyers were distributed, I followed up with direct

phone calls and email. I allotted a total of five attempts per eligible contact before excluding them from my survey population.

Overall, 46.7 percent of the eligible survey pool consented to interview. Once a participant consented, I scheduled a time and location of their choosing. I stressed that they should choose a location where they felt comfortable talking that afforded them a level of privacy. As a result, I interviewed participants everywhere from libraries and coffee shops to people's offices and backyards. I did not present the research hypotheses to participants prior to interview, because I did not want to bias their responses. I described the study more generally by saying, "I am conducting a study to better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view and participate in politics here and abroad. I am gathering research information by interviewing individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries."

Before beginning the interview, I presented each participant with an WSU IRB-approved Information Sheet. The IRB stipulated that I use an Information Sheet rather than a signed Informed Consent form, because they were concerned about my having identifying information on file for participants who may be illegal immigrants. Please see the Information Sheet in Appendix C. To protect participants' confidentiality further, I coded every interview protocol with a numeric identifier only, and I did not keep a listing associating participants' names with their identification number.

I provided Information Sheets to the participants in English and their native language, and I reviewed the entire form with them before beginning the interview. I

offered participants the option of reading from the printed interview protocol as I interviewed them. I felt that this was an additional safeguard to over-coming any potential communication barriers, and it also seems to make the participants feel more at ease in answering question with numerous response options. Two participants requested that a translator be present at the time of interview, and so I arranged for the translator to assist. All of the other participants preferred to be interviewed in English.

I recorded each interview using a digital audio recorder, and I transcribed the audio recordings into written transcripts coded with the participants' assigned identification number. I reviewed each transcript for accuracy. I then entered coded closed-ended quantitative responses into an SPSS 18.0 dataset. I cleaned the data and reviewed it for accuracy. As a final quality measure, an assistant read all of the closed-ended responses and confirmed their accurate entry into the dataset. I reviewed each transcript a second time to highlight qualitative results selected for inclusion in the analysis. I selected qualitative responses for inclusion based on their clarity, completeness and relevance. Overall, the response had to be audibly understandable. The participant had to provide a complete answer to the question at hand. Finally, responses had to be relevant, regardless of whether or not they lent support to the hypotheses. I excluded all small talk and peripheral conversation from the transcripts.

Data Analysis Plan

I examined each hypothesis in its own context. Hypothesis 1 called for within-group comparisons, and Hypothesis 2 called for between-groups comparisons. To start,

I compiled frequency distributions for all variables. For Hypothesis 1 tests, I limited cases to only those participants in the conflict group. I then cross-tabulated the data to determine which factors in addition to conflict/non-conflict group status potentially influenced my dependent variables. Where associations were evident, I conducted appropriate correlation tests and interpreted results. Since I was dealing with almost entirely nominal-level variables, I used Pearson's Chi Square and proportional reduction in error (PRE) measures such as Lambda and Cramer's V. Where tables were 2x2, I reported the Chi Square statistic, and where they were greater, I reported the Lambda and Cramer's V.

I tabulated political participation scores for every participant. I assigned each survey response measuring a dependent variable a total number of possible points with higher points indicating a higher magnitude of participation in that particular political activity. I totaled all points to create each participant's specific political participation score. The highest possible cumulative score was 20 points for sending state activity and 20 points for receiving state activity. For Hypothesis 1, I compared the two scores to determine whether each conflict participant engaged in more in sending or receiving state activity, and I measured associations between control variables and mean participation scores. For Hypothesis 2, I compared scores between the conflict and non-conflict group and then engaged in further analysis.

Validity

Did I measure what I intended to measure? Are my measures appropriate indicators of the concepts I put forth? Tashakkor and Teddlie (1998:67) define internal validity simply as, "...the degree to which we can *trust* the conclusions/inferences of the researcher regarding the "causal" relationship between variable/events." I worked to assure internal validity in several ways. For the quantitative analysis, I included a range of controls for extraneous variables, and I used appropriate statistical measures to isolate and explain their effects on the dependent variables. I also designed the study to require both within- and between- groups comparisons so that I could better illuminate behavioral patterns.

Throughout the qualitative analysis, I applied consistent meaning to questions and terms both during of the interviews and in my explanation of results. I worked to ensure that my interpretation was true to the participants' intended responses. I accomplished this mainly by keeping my audio recordings and transcripts closely tied to the interview questionnaire to ensure all responses were kept within context. I also examined each participant's open-ended responses in conjunction with their closed-ended responses to ensure that results were consistent and note any behavior that seemed out of step with those reported by the participant throughout the broader interview. As Tashakkori and Teddlie (198, 88) put it, I was "comparing individuals to themselves."

Because I had to forego random sampling for a snowball sampling approach, the biggest threat to internal validity is selection bias. As with any participation study, results may be jeopardized by those pre-dispositioned to participate in a study to begin with. Although selection bias may exist, nevertheless, the narrow selection criteria yielded a distinct and important subset of people. Although I tried to control for as many variables as possible, there are possible extraneous effects from other factors. Neighborhood effects, pre-existing interest in politics, connections to specific political issues, etc.

Methodological Challenges

Mahler (1998: 91) writes, "...transnationalism should not be expected to produce even, linear or neat patterns. Indeed, it is in the ambiguous and seemingly contradictory findings that scholars are most likely to broaden their understanding of transnationalism." Consider the challenges presented in appropriately observing modern immigration phenomena. For one, individuals experience a great many things leading up to and during migration, which breed varying levels of personal and social capital. Some immigrants arrive with nothing. Others arrive with substantial financial and social means. As Guarnizo and Smith (1998) point out, there are disparate rates of access (social, political, economic and otherwise) since migratory groups are themselves heterogeneous. Migratory populations display varied educational, professional, and linguistic capabilities. As such, it would be imprudent to suggest that all migrants have the same access to incorporation in sending and receiving states' structures.

Throughout the analyses, the greatest problems were attributable to three main factors: (1) small sample size, and (2) extensive use of nominal-level variables, and (3) lack of significant variation between many responses. These factors significantly challenged my ability to report statistics with a degree of confidence. Specifically, Chi Square assumes that there are at least five cells present per frequency. Few of my frequency distributions fulfilled this assumption, and so I caveat those tests with the note that they are significantly less powerful than they would be with a much larger dataset.

CHAPTER FOUR – RESEARCH POPULATION

As acknowledged, transnational political participation is not new. However, we do not know enough about the distinct transnational political habits of different groups and what factors shape them. To date, research has lent most attention to studying non-conflict migrants' as actors in home- and hostland political structures. We know something of "forced" migration and its effects, but existing data and studies are not abundant. In particular, the literature amply conceptualizes "diaspora," and we have some understanding of how diasporas form coalitions and exert influence on the politics of their sending and receiving communities. But how does this compare to the habits of non-diasporic groups -- groups for whom conflict was not a factor in migration? Does having been forced to leave the homeland shape a person's experience more or less so than voluntary departure? It remains unclear also what matters most in determining where migrants will associate their political identity and subsequent loyalties, more generally.

In Chapter 4, I first describe the total research population demographically. Then I present political participation statistics for the group over to demonstrate a baseline, and I juxtapose this data with available statistics regarding the non-immigrant U.S. population as well as the broader population of U.S. immigrants. I conclude with a summary of pertinent results and a brief review of my hypotheses and research

questions. In Chapter 5, I present findings specific to Hypothesis 1, and I review Hypothesis 2 in Chapter 6.

Population Demographics

Approximately 42 percent of the research population was male, and 52.8 percent was female. Thirty-three percent were born in Albania, 22.2 percent in Kosovo, and 44.4 percent in Bosnia. Nearly 87 percent of respondents reported being from an urban center, 5.6 percent were from rural areas and 7.3 percent indicated their hometown was suburban. Among all participants, 41.7 percent were married currently, and 58.3 percent indicated their marital status as “single.” At the time of interview, participants’ ranged from 20 years old to 69 years old. The median age was 28.5, which is younger than the U.S. foreign-born population overall. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the median age for the total U.S. population is 36.7, and the foreign-born population has a median age of 40.2. Based on participants’ birth year and the year they reported arriving in the United States, I calculated also an “Age at Migration.” See Table 3 and Table 4 for precise age distribution on both indicators.

Table 3 – Participant Age at Interview

Age at Interview (in years)	Frequency	Percent
18-24	12	33.3
25-34	11	30.6
35-44	4	11.1
45-54	6	16.7
55-64	2	5.6
65+	1	2.8
Total	36	100.0

Table 4 – Participant Age at Migration

Age (in years)	Frequency	Percent
Under 11	4	11.1
11-17	15	41.7
18-24	3	8.3
25-34	7	19.4
35-44	5	13.9
45-54	2	5.6
55-64	0	0
Total	36	100.0

I asked participants to indicate their religious affiliation, if any. Everyone fell into one of three groups: 47.2 percent were Muslim, 27.8 percent indicated No Religion, and 25.0 percent were Christian. Within the context of the survey, “Muslim” contained all denominations and sects of Islam. In the survey questionnaire, I described “Christian” as containing the following denominations: Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic,

Greek, Orthodox, and Mormon. Participants who self-identified as having “no religion” were agnostic, atheist, or simply indicated “no religion.”

Participants indicated the level of education achieved in their home country as well as in the United States. I present also the highest level of educational attainment, overall. As Table 5 illustrates, all participants had attained some level of college education at the time of interview. This is significantly higher than educational attainment for the general U.S. native-born populations. In Table 6, I use data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 2008 Current population survey to illustrate comparative educational achievement across the three populations.⁵

Table 5 - Participant Level of Education

Education Level	Education in Country of Origin		Education in US		Highest Overall Level of Education	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
None	2.8	1	13.9	5	0	0
Elementary School	27.8	10	0	0	0	0
Middle School	16.7	6	2.8	1	0	0
High School	13.9	5	0	0	0	0
One Year of College	5.6	2	11.1	4	8.3	3
Two Years of College	8.3	3	16.7	6	22.2	8
Three Years of College	0	0	11.1	4	11.1	4
Four Years of College	16.7	6	16.7	6	30.5	11
Five or More Years of College	8.3	3	19.4	7	27.7	10
Course/Cert Program	0	0	8.3	3	0	0
Total	100	36	100	36	100	36

⁵ U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, "Foreign-born Workers: Labor Force Characteristics in 2008"

Table 6 - Participant Education Level Compared to U.S. Foreign-Born and Native

Education Level	Study Population	U.S. Foreign Born Population	U.S. Native Born Population
Less than a high school diploma	0	26.4	5.8
High school graduates, no college	0	25.2	29.7
Some college or associate degree	41.6	16.7	30.0
Bachelor's degree or higher	58.2	31.7	34.6

Participants provided their current and former employment status. Notably, just half of the population was not of working age at migration. Table 7 depicts employment status.

Table 7 - Participant Employment Status Pre- and Post-Migration

	Employment Status in Country of Origin		Employment Status in US	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
Working	30.6	11	80.6	29
Looking for Work	8.3	3	8.3	3
Keeping House	2.8	1	0	0
Going to School	8.3	3	8.3	3
Retired	0	0	2.8	1
Not of Working Age	50	18	0	0
Total	100	36	100	36

Considering the economic climate at the time this research was undertaken, the employment rate among participants is very high. At the time of interview, the United States endured an economic recession that had far-reaching consequences for state and local unemployment rates. At the end of 2009, the national unemployment rate was

10.0 percent. In Michigan unemployment rates levied from 12.4 percent-15.6 percent, and in the Detroit metropolitan area, they swung between 13percent and 17.7 percent.⁶

Participants provided their annual income before and after migration. Due to the turbulent economic conditions and variable currency value within Albania, Kosova and Bosnia during the early- to mid-1990s, it is not possible to calculate equivalent income ranges in USD. Conflict had also dislocated people within their country of origin, and in many cases, had forced people from their jobs. In summary, all participants either were unemployed or earning under \$25,000 USD before moving to the United States. Additionally, the U.S. Census Bureau has not updated U.S. foreign-born income statistics since 1999. Given incredible changes both within the foreign born population and in the U.S. economy over the last decade, comparing 1999 income to 2009 income levels is not reliable. Instead, Table 8 provides participants' income ranges at the time of interview compared to income ranges for the total U.S. population.⁷

⁶ Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Employment status of the foreign-born and native-born populations by selected characteristics, 2007-08 annual averages" <http://www.bls.gov/news.release/forbrn.t01.htm>

⁷ U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, 2009 Annual Social and Economic Supplement, "Selected Characteristics of People 15 Years Old and Over by Total Money Income in 2008, Work Experience in 2008, Race, Hispanic Origin, and Sex." http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/cpstables/032009/perinc/new01_001.htm

Table 8 - Participant Income Compared to General U.S. Population

	Study Population	U.S. Population
	Percent	Percent
No income	13.9	
Less than \$25,000	30.6	47.4
\$25,000-\$35,000	8.3	13.7
\$35,000-\$45,000	11.1	10.6
\$45,000-\$55,000	11.1	8.0
\$55,000-\$65,000	8.3	5.22
Over \$65,000	5.6	15.1
Not of Working Age	0	n/a
Refuse to Answer	0	n/a
Total	100	100.0

Migration and Citizenship

Participants described their migration and citizenship experiences. At the time of interview, all participants had resided in the United States since initial arrival. Approximately 33 percent spoke English fluently upon arrival, and 66.7 percent did not. In order to assess participant's Immigration Status at the time of entry into the United States, I provided closed-ended response options using terms defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS)⁸.

Options included:

Permanent Resident – A permanent resident is not a citizen, but resides legally in the United States. Permanent residents are commonly referred to as “Green Card Holders.”

Without Papers – I defined “without papers” to mean that the individual had no legally recognized immigration or citizenship status upon arrival in the United States.

⁸ <http://www.uscis.gov>, accessed January 23, 2010.

Visa – A U.S. visa allows an individual entry and temporary stay in the United States under a certain status. These statuses include: temporary worker, student or visitor.

Asylee/Refugee – An individual who is “unable or unwilling” to return to her or his home country out of fear of persecution or harm. According to USCIS, persecution must be founded on “race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion.” Asylees must reside in the United States at the time of application for asylum, whereas refugees typically are outside of the United States at application.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) – Temporary Protected Status (TPS) provides a legislative basis for individuals seeking temporary refuge in the United States due to armed conflict, environmental disaster, or some other extenuating circumstance occurring in the home country.

I provided also an option for participants to specify another status if there’s was not listed, or simply indicate that they did not know what immigration status. I summarize results in Table 9.

Table 9 - Participant Immigration Status at Arrival in U.S.

Status	Percent	Frequency
Permanent Resident	33.3	12
Without Papers	5.6	2
Tourist Visa	2.8	1
Asylee or Refugee	50.0	18
Temporary Protected Immigrant	2.8	1
Other	2.8	1
Don't Know	2.8	1
Total	100.0	36

In order to become a naturalized U.S. citizen, an individual must reside within the United States for at least five years. The residency requirement may be lessened if

the individual applying for citizenship is married to (and resides with) a U.S. citizen for a minimum of three years. Within the study population, 8.3 percent of participants were not yet eligible to obtain U.S. citizenship. However, all of them had initiated the citizenship process and intended to become naturalized. Within the remaining population eligible for citizenship, 90.9 percent of participants were U.S. citizens at the time of interview, and 9.1 percent were not. This is more than double the rate of naturalization than that for the total U.S. foreign-born population. According to the 2008 American Community Survey (ACS), 43 percent the foreign born living in the United States were naturalized citizens.⁹

Over half of the research population (52.8 percent) had been U.S. citizens for between five and ten years. Another 30.6 percent had been U.S. citizens for less than five years. The U.S. Government allows dual citizenship, and becoming naturalized does not require that an individual surrender citizenship status in their home country. However, home country citizenship may be forfeited if (a) the country of origin has laws specifically prohibiting dual citizenship, and (b) a U.S. immigrants revokes their home country citizenship formally. A dual citizen is subject to the laws of both countries. As such, some immigrants choose to revoke their homeland citizenship so they are not liable for taxes or military responsibilities in a country in which they no longer reside. Nearly 70 percent (69.4 percent) of the research population maintained dual citizenship

⁹ U.S. Census Bureau, 2008 American Community Survey, <http://www.census.gov/acs/www/> [Accessed January 27, 2010].

between the U.S. and their country of origin. Just over 19 percent did not, and 11.1 percent did not know whether or not they had dual citizenship.

Overall, 66.7 percent of participants had lived in the United States for over ten years, 25 percent for five to ten years, and 8.3 percent for less than five years. Of those participants were U.S. citizens at the time of interview, 2.8 percent had more than ten years between their arrival in the United States and citizenship, 75 percent had five to ten years, and 5.6 percent had less than five years.

I asked participants to choose a primary and secondary reason for relocating from a list of closed-ended responses. Specifically, I posed the question, “If you had to pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the United States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to the United States? Please choose **only one** response.” Response choices included: to find work, to reunite with family, to get an education, to get a “better life” overall, fled from conflict, fled political persecution, and fled religious persecution. Participants could also specify a response of “other” if they felt their answer was not listed. I followed up by asking, “Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the next best statement to describe what most influenced you to move to the United States? Please choose **only one** response.” Table 10 includes both response sets.

Table 10 - Participant Reason for Relocation to U.S.

Reason for Relocating	Primary Reason		Secondary Reason	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
To find work	2.8	1	2.8	1
Reunite with family	2.8	1	8.3	3
Get an education	19.4	7	22.2	8
Get a "better life" overall	38.9	14	25.0	9
Fled conflict	25.0	9	13.9	5
Fled political persecution	11.1	4	2.8	1
Fled religious persecution	0	0	5.6	2
No Response	0	0	19.4	7
Totals	100	36	100	36

In order to assign participants to a “conflict” or “non-conflict” group, I created a variable to indicate “presence of conflict” at the time of departure, basing the response for each participant on two factors: presence of war in the country of origin at the time of the participants’ departure and the indication of conflict being present on the part of the participant in his/her open-ended response to the question, “Can you tell me why you decided to relocate to the United States?” Based on these responses, 66.7 percent of participants experienced the presence of conflict in their country of origin, and 33.3 percent did not.

I asked participants whether or not they had received relocation assistance (monetary, legal or otherwise) from any non-governmental organization when they migrated from their home country to the United States. Just over 55 percent indicated that they received some form or organizational support, and 44.4 percent did not.

Participants who received assistance mentioned the United Nations High Committee on Refugees (UNHCR), Red Cross, Jewish Family Services and several Lutheran faith-based organizations as having provided them assistance.

Since I seek ultimately to measure differences in civic and political participation, I am interested also in learning whether participants interact with organizational structures outside of their work. I asked participants about these affiliations, and I considered any interaction with a cultural, social, academic, athletic, professional or faith-based organization to be an organizational affiliation. As such, 66.7 percent of participants indicated an organizational tie, and 33.3 percent said they had none.

Interactions with Country of Origin

Participants had varied interactions with the people and systems in their homeland. Just over 8 percent had never visited their country of origin since relocation, and 58percent visited fewer than five times. Another 27.8 percent visited the sending state five to ten times, and 5.6percent visited on more than ten occasions. Just over 80 percent of participants indicated that they or their immediate family (as was the case with many younger respondents) still owned property in the country of origin, 13.9 percent did not, and 2.8 percent were unsure. Participants' described their properties as residential, ranging from small apartments to flats and homes. In some cases, family members or friends resided in the property. In other cases, the property was rented to a third party.

Of those participants who had living parents (91.6 percent in total), 22.7 percent had parents still living in their country of origin only, while 60.6 percent have parents living in the United States only. All participants who had children (41.7 percent of the total population) indicated that their children lived either in the United States or a European Union country. No one reported that their children resided in the family's country of origin. Twenty-five percent of participants did not have siblings. Approximately 33 percent of the remaining participants had a sibling (or siblings) living in their country of origin only, and 59.2 percent had siblings living in the United States only. Over 7 percent had siblings living in both countries. I asked participants whether they felt they had more friends residing currently in the United States or their country of origin. About half (52.8 percent) indicated they have more friends residing in the United States. But 11.1 percent indicated they had more friends in their country of origin, and 33.3 percent said the number of friends in each location was "about the same." One participant (2.8 percent) was unsure. Participants were evenly split when it came to their opinions on repatriation. Fifty percent said they would consider moving back to their home country and 50 percent said they would not.

Participants described the frequency with which they send financial remittances back to family and/or friends in their country of origin to "help out." Similarly, I asked participants if they ever send money back to their country of origin to support "projects." I defined projects as "charitable works, development projects, education

efforts and/or schools, faith-based initiatives, or some other project.” Table 11 presents remittance results.

Table 11 - Financial Remittance Frequency

Frequency	Family/Friend		Project	
	Percent	Frequency	Percent	Frequency
Never	25.0	9	66.7	24
Once only	2.8	1	8.3	3
Every one or two years	8.3	3	8.3	3
Once per year	16.7	6	5.6	2
More than once per year	41.7	15	5.6	2
Total	94.4	34	34	34
No Response	5.6	2	2	3
	100.0	36	100.0	36

Civic and Political Participation

How does an action or interaction become inherently political or civic-minded?

There are many actions one may take that can be construed as having a civic flavor, but only a few that are undeniably political. As Putnam (2000) and many other suggest, voting is an inherently political action taken by private citizens. Generally, political activities also include political party membership and financial contributions to political candidates or parties. Individuals may also take avid interest in gathering information about political issues and causes or go so far as to contact a public official, friend of family member in an effort to persuade them toward their point of view.

I asked participants to respond to a number of open- and closed-ended questions measuring the type and frequency of “political” activities in which people

engaged. For each question, I asked specifically about activities undertaken with respect to both the U.S. and the participants' country of origin. I asked also about the sources from which participants gather information about political happenings in the United States and their home country. Optional responses included: public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.), friends and/or family, community organizations, other (please specify). Participants could also specify, "I do not gather information about politics in my home country."

I asked participants generally, "Are there any political issues that are important to you?" I explained that these could be issues of interest pertaining to U.S. politics, politics of the home state, or issues that would fall more broadly under the milieu of world politics" or "current events." Slightly over 86 percent of participants said yes, while 11.1 percent said no, and 2.8 percent did not know. I followed up with an open-ended question seeking to understand the issues of greatest importance to participants. I elaborate on these responses in the qualitative analysis contained in Chapter 5. Although exact data for the general U.S. population was not available, it is interesting to note the 2006 Social Capital Survey conducted by the Roper Center for Public Opinion research.¹⁰ Investigators asked survey respondents, "How interested are you in politics and national affairs?" Respondents answered as such: 7.9 percent said "not at all,"

¹⁰ Social Capital Community Survey, 2006 data collected by Professor Robert D. Putnam of the Saguro Seminar Civic Engagement in America, a project of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and numerous community foundations nation-wide, and made available through the Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.

16.7percent said “only slightly interested,” 37.6percent said “somewhat interested,” and 37.8percent said “very interested.”

I asked participants, “Would you say you were a more politically active person before or after you migrated to the United States?” I excluded participants who were children at relocation, which rendered 50percent of the total population eligible to answer the question. Of this segment, just 8.3percent indicated that they were more politically active before relocating, while 22.2percent were more active after. An additional 5.6percent of participants said they were “about the same” pre- and post-migration, and 13.9percent said they were “never really politically active.”

Next, I asked participants a series of questions intended to gauge political effects of migration and level of interaction with political structures in the United States versus the country of origin. To start, I asked participant, “Today, are you more politically active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political affairs of your home country?” I then followed up by asking, “Which political events are more important to you currently – those of the United States, or those of your home country?” I described “political events” as “elections, policy change, changes to the political structure or political parties, etc.” Table 12 contains results.

Table 12 - Political Activity and Issues Most Important

	More Politically Active		Political Issues Most Important	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
US	15	41.7	20	55.6
Country of Origin	1	2.8	3	8.3
About the same in both	11	30.6	12	33.3
Not active in either	9	25.0	1	2.8
Total	36	100.0	36	100

The survey questionnaire sought to establish political further political behaviors, especially those associated with such overt political activities as voting, political partisanship, and making financial contributions to political causes. I use Table 13 to describe participants' voting habits. Participants were asked whether or not they had voted in an election in the United States or their country of origin *since relocating to the United States*. In other words, in order to be counted as a "yes," the participants vote in either country had to be cast since they have lived in the United States.

Table 13 - Participant Voting Behavior

	U.S. Election		Country of Origin Election	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Not Eligible to Vote	5	13.9	0	0
Yes	23	63.9	5	13.9
No	8	22.2	31	86.1
Total	36	100.0	36	100.0

This is comparable to general U.S. election voter turnout. The General Social Survey (GSS) reports that 66.9 percent of survey respondents voted in the 2004 U.S. Presidential election, while 24.0 percent did not, and 9.1 percent were ineligible.¹¹

Participants provided also their political party affiliations. I asked participants to provide only those party affiliations that they held at the time of interview and not previously. Nearly 37 percent claimed no U.S. political party affiliation. The remaining participants were 50percent Democrats, 5.6 percent Republicans, 8.3 percent Independent, and 5.6percent “other.” Over 19 percent of participants claimed they were affiliated with a political party on their home country, and 80.6percent were not. Another common measure of political engagement is political candidate or party contributions. The GSS reports that 21.1 percent of their survey respondents had made a political contribution over the last three to four years to “a political party or candidate or any other political cause.” The remaining 78.9 percent had not.¹² I asked participants how often they had made financial contributions to political candidates and political parties since relocating. These could be contributions to a United States entity or an entity in the country of origin. I present participant responses in Table 14.

¹¹ Davis, James Allan and Smith, Tom W. *General social surveys, 1972-2008*[machine-readable data file] /Principal Investigator, James A. Davis; Director and Co-Principal Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Sponsored by National Science Foundation. --NORC ed.-- Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer]; Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor], 2009.

¹² Ibid.

Table 14 - Financial Contribution to Candidates and/or Parties

	Candidate or Party in the United States		Candidate or Party in Country of Origin	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Never	24	66.7	33	97.1
Once only	5	13.9	1	2.8
Every one or two years	6	16.7	2	5.6
Once per year	1	2.8	0	0
Total	36	100.0	36	100.0

The GSS also provides statistics on survey respondents' interactions with public figures. Approximately 22.3 percent of respondents had "contacted or attempted to contact a politician or civil servant to express their views" within the last year.¹³ Another 20.9 percent of respondents indicated having done so in "the more distant past." I spoke with study participants about their direct interactions with political figures by asking, "Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure in the United States to relay your views on some issue?" I described "political figures" as "elected officials, bureaucrats, federal, state or local leaders, etc." I then followed up with the same question, applicable instead to political figures in the country of origin. Results are shown in Table 15.

¹³ Ibid.

Table 15 - Interaction with Political Figures

	Contacted US Political Figure		Contacted Political Figure in Country of Origin	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Never	24	66.7	31	86.1
Once only	5	13.9	1	2.8
Once per year	2	5.6	0	0
Every one or two years	0	0	1	2.8
More than once per year	5	13.9	3	8.3
Total	36	100.0	36	100.0

The GSS asks, “When you hold as strong opinion about politics, how often do you try to persuade your friends, relatives or fellow workers to share your views?” To which 12.5 percent of respondents indicated, “often,” and 29.2 percent said, “sometimes.” Thirty-three percent said, “rarely,” while the remaining 25.3 percent said, “never.”¹⁴

I wanted to measure less structured, more personal mechanisms of political participation within this research population as well. “Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence people’s opinions about politics? In this case, I’m interested in how you’ve communicated with people living in the United States. Please select all that apply.” Response options included: Letter, Email, Internet Blog, Phone Call, Boycott some business or product, Other (please specify). I then asked

¹⁴ Ibid.

the same question with regard to influence exerted on individuals living in the participants' country of origin. Upon analyzing the results, I found that it was less important which means of communication an individual was using, as it was how many. This approach lent a better lens for frequency and intensity of interaction. See results summarized in Table 16.

Table 16 - Methods Use to Influence Political Opinions

	U.S.		Country of Origin	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
None	20	55.6	23	63.9
One	7	19.4	7	19.4
Two	4	11.1	5	13.9
Three	2	5.6	1	2.8
Four	1	2.8	0	0
Six or more	2	5.6	0	0
Total	36	100.0	36	100.0

Now that I've described the general demographic and political participation characteristics of the of the research population, I turn toward examining my hypotheses and reporting results of the surveys and data analyses. I examine first the in-group comparison and then draw comparisons between the conflict and non-conflict groups.

CHAPTER FIVE – CONFLICT GROUP SENDING AND RECEIVING STATE POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

In Hypothesis 1, I posit that conflict migrants participate in politics more in their sending state than in their receiving state post-resettlement. Previous research demonstrates that there is typically a transnational dimension to contemporary migrants' economic, political and social spheres. I suggested that conflict migrants would participate more in the sending state than the receiving state, for several reasons. For one, the "suddenness" of departure leaves conflict migrants little time to accept the emergent distance to family, friends, and property as well as learn the language and customs of the receiving community. Many conflict migrants seek to stay engaged or even to repatriate to the homestate.

Research questions related to Hypothesis 1 include:

- *Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict migrants?*
- *Are some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participate in sending state politics post-settlement than others?*
- *What factors influenced conflict migrants' engagement in the sending versus receiving state?*

Since the second research question is so similar to the hypothesis, I refocused my efforts toward examining additional questions as well. For instance, do such factors as property ownership in the home state or frequent return trips to the homestate influence conflict migrants' engagement in the sending versus receiving state? Are

some resettled conflict migrants more likely to participation in sending state politics than others?

I cross-tabulated all of my dependent variables and control variables, and then selected the most significant for further correlational testing. These included country of origin, gender, religion and age at interview. I reference these cross-tabulations and correlations throughout this chapter to illustrate findings. I conclude that the conflict group overall participated more in U.S. politics than sending state politics, which was a null finding. Across all indicators, participants were more engaged politically in the receiving state than the sending state. I conclude this chapter with a summary of these indicators, and suggest reasons for the finding.

Sending and Receiving State Activity Comparisons

To start, I asked conflict group participants what “political issues” were important to them. This question was open-ended and participants could identify issues pertaining to the sending state, receiving state, world politics or really any area of interest to them. Over 83 percent identified a political issue of importance to them, and over 16 percent did not. Fifty five percent of respondents specified a political issue related to their sending state. Issues specific to Bosnia and Kosovo include: economic stability, civil rights, government corruption, state sovereignty and preservation of democracy. Remaining participants spoke of war, human rights, U.S. economic recovery, U.S. health care reform, and U.S. immigration reform. All of the participants who did not express an issue area of importance to them were women. Over 66

percent were Bosnian, and 33.3 percent were Kosovar. The responses were spread evenly across religious affiliations with one participant being Christian, one Muslim and one having no religion. Just over 33 percent were under 31 and 66 percent were over 31.

In a closed-ended response, I asked participants if they had any interest in U.S. foreign policy toward their sending state. Over 83 percent said yes, and 16.7 percent said no. Seventy-five percent of those who said no were Bosnian, and 25 percent were Kosovar. Seventy five percent were women, and 25 percent were men. Fifty percent had no religion, 25 percent were Christian and 25 percent were Muslim. There was no so significant association between variables, as demonstrated by the correlation tests in Appendix A.

I employed also closed-ended and scaled comparative behavioral measures. In other words, I included questions asking, “Do you engage in this political behavior in the United States?” and then “Do you engage in this same political behavior in your sending state?” Participants selected the number of means by which they gathered political information about their sending and receiving state. Possible means of gathering information included public information sources (such as newspapers and magazines, Internet resources, television and radio, etc.), friends and family, and community organizations. Participants could also indicate any methods used that I had not listed, and I included those responses in the frequency distributions. I provide these distributions in Table 17.

Table 17 - Means Used to Gather Political Information (Conflict Group)

<i>Number of Means Used</i>	<i>United States Politics</i>		<i>Sending State Politics</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
None	1	4.2	2	8.3
One	19	79.2	14	58.3
Two	2	8.3	6	25.0
Three	2	8.3	2	8.3

Comparatively, 95.8 percent of conflict participants used one or more means to obtain information about US politics, and 91.6 percent used one or more means to obtain information about country of origin politics. However, only 16.6 percent use more than one means to gather information about U.S. politics, while 33.3 percent use more than one means to gather information about sending state politics. So, while slightly more participants gathered information about the receiving state, participants used slightly more information sources in the sending state than they so in the receiving state. The only participant who did not gather information about U.S. politics was a Christian Bosnian woman who was over 31 years old. Both of the participants who did not gather political information about the sending state were Christian Bosnian women over 31 years old. I include my correlation tests in Tables X and X (Appendix A) to illustrate that none of the control variables significantly predicted the number of means used to gather political information.

I asked conflict group participants who were legal U.S. citizens (95.8 percent of the group) whether they had ever voted in a U.S. election. Eighty-seven percent of eligible participants had voted in a U.S. election, and 13 percent had not. Non-voters were 66.7 percent Bosnian and 33.3 percent Kosovar. They were 66.7 percent male, and 33.3 percent female. Most (66.7 percent) were Muslim, and 33.3 percent were Christian. Nearly 67 percent were under 31, and 33.3 percent were over 31 years old. Conversely, 20.8 percent of conflict group participants voted in their sending state since resettlement, and nearly 80 percent did not. Eighty percent of those who voted in their home country were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar. Sixty percent were men, and 40 percent were women. Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no religion. Forty percent were under 31 and 60 percent were over 31. Correlations contained in Appendix A indicated no significant associations with control variables.

Over 70 percent of the conflict group affiliated with a U.S. political party. The majority of participants (62.5 percent) were Democrats, and 8.3 percent were Independents. None were Republican. Over 29 percent had no party affiliation. Participants without a U.S. political party affiliation were 71.4 percent Bosnian and 28.6 percent were Kosovar. Just over 51 percent were men, and 42.9 percent were women. Over 71 percent were Muslim, 14.3 percent were Christian and 14.3 percent had no religion. Nearly 43 percent were under 31 years old, and 57.1 percent were over 31 years old. Twenty one percent affiliated with sending state political parties. Eighty percent were Bosnian, and 20 percent were Kosovar. Sixty percent were men, and 40

percent were women. Sixty percent were Muslim, and 40 percent had no religion. Most (80 percent) were under 31 at the time of interview, and 20 percent were older. There were no significant relationships between political party affiliation and the control variables.

I followed the political party affiliation questions with questions about financial contributions to sending and receiving state political parties and candidates. Over 33 percent of the conflict group had made contributions to U.S. candidate or party at least once since resettlement, and 66.7 percent had never done so. Those who did not contribute money were approximately 69 percent Bosnian and 31 percent Kosovar. Over 62 percent were women, and 37.5 percent were men. Over 56 percent were Muslim, 25 percent had no religion and 18.8 percent were Christians. Just over 56 percent were under 31, and 43.8 percent were over 31 years old. Only 8.4 percent of participants had made a financial contribution to a party in the sending state, and 91.7 percent had not. Of those participants that did make a contribution to a sending state party or candidate, one was from Bosnia and one was from Kosovo. Both were men under 31 years old who indicated they had no religion. Results in Appendix A reveal no significant correlations.

Over 79 percent of conflict group participants had never contacted a U.S. political figure, but the remaining 20.8 percent contacted someone at least once. Over 8 percent contacted an official once per year, and another 8 percent contacted someone more than once per year. Those who did contact someone were 80 percent

Kosovar and 20 percent Bosnian. Sixty percent were women, and 40 percent were men. Sixty percent had no religion, 20 percent were Christian, and 20 percent were Muslim. Sixty percent were younger than 31, and 40 percent were older. The relationship between country of origin and U.S. political contact was significant at $\chi^2(3) = .698, p = .011$. As I discuss in-depth in Chapter 6, I believe this association is due, in part, to a strong connection between Kosovars and their more politically established Albanian counterparts. The Albanians, having a long generational presence in the Detroit area, have a significant history of cultural organization and business investment in the area. As such, they have paved more in-roads with local politicians, and they frequently share this access with members of the Kosovar population.

The number of participants contacting sending state political figures was comparable to receiving state contact. Some 83.3 percent of the conflict group never made contact with a political figure, and over 16 percent contacted someone with frequency ranging from once only to more than once a year. Seventy five percent of those who did were Kosovar, and 25 percent were Bosnian. The participants were split at 50 percent men and 50 percent women. Fifty percent were Muslim, 25 percent were Christian and 25 percent had no religion. Participants were also evenly split by age with 50 percent being under 31 and 50 percent being older than 31 years. Correlational tests between controls and sending state political participation were insignificant. These results are in Tables X and X in Appendix A.

I asked participants to indicate how many methods they use to “influence other people’s opinions about politics. Possible choices included email, direct calling, letter-writing, protesting, and boycotting. Participants were allowed to indicate methods not listed on the questionnaire as well. Over 37 percent of participants said they tried to influence the political opinion of someone living in the United States, and 62.5 percent did not. Those who did were 66.7 percent Bosnian, and 33.3 percent Kosovar. Nearly 67 percent were male, and 33.3 percent were female. Over 44 percent were Muslim, 33.3 percent had no religion, and 22.2 percent were Christian. Nearly 56 percent were under 31, and 44.4 percent were 31 or older. As shown in Appendix A, none of the control variables statistically correlated with attempts to influence U.S. political opinions.

Results for influencing political opinions of people in the sending state were very similar to those for the receiving state with 66.7 percent never doing so, and 33.3 percent using one or more means of influence. Of those who did try to influence sending state opinions, 62.5 percent were Bosnian, and 37.5 percent were Kosovar. Over 63 percent were men, and 37.5 percent were women. Results were spread across religious affiliation with 37.5 percent being Christian, 37.5 percent having no religion, and 25 percent being Muslim. Over 37.5 percent were under 31 years, and 62.5 percent were over 31 years old. There were no statistically significant relationships between variables, demonstrated in Appendix A, Tables X and X.

When seeking to understand if participants were more or less politically active after migrating to the United States, I excluded participants who were young children at the time of resettlement, because they said they felt were too young to be independent political actors prior to resettlement. This ruled out 45.0 percent of the total group. Responses for before/after migration were the same with 23.1 percent saying before, and 23.1 percent saying after. Over 15 percent said they felt they had the same level of involvement before and after migration, and 38.5 percent said they were never really active. There were no characteristics distinguishing one response set or another with the exception of the “was never active” results. Eighty percent of those who said they were never really active were women, and all of them were Bosnian. They were spread across religions with 60 percent being Christian, 20 percent Muslim, and 20 percent having no religion. All of them were over 34 years old. I did not detect any statistically significant associations.

I asked participants which political events were most important to them – those of the sending state or those in the receiving state. Nearly 67 percent said U.S. politics were of greater importance to them. Over 29 percent of respondents said that country of origin political events had the same importance to them as U.S. political events. Just one participant (4.2 percent) indicated that country of origin political events were more important to her. Correlation tests revealed no statistically significant relationships between controls and dependent variables. Appendix A contains findings.

I asked participants outright whether they were more politically active in the sending or receiving state at the time of interview. No one said they were more active in their sending state than their receiving state. Forty-one percent said they were more active in U.S. politics, and nearly 38 percent said their activity was “about the same in both.” Within this subset, 66.7 percent of these participants were Bosnian, and 33.3 percent were Kosovar. Additionally, 66.7 percent were men, and 33.3 percent were women. Nearly 67 percent were Muslim, 22.2 percent had no religion, and 11.1 percent were Christian. The findings in Appendix A indicate that none of the control variables significantly predict importance of political events.

Comparing Conflict Group Political Participation Scores

I calculated a “political participation score” for each participant based on a fixed number of points per response to questions about political behavior. The lowest possible score was zero, and the highest was 20. Actual scores for US participation spread from 2 to 13 points, and the median score was 4.5 with a standard deviation of 2.75. The mean score was 5.29. I provide the spread of all scores in Table 18.

Table 18 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Receiving State)

Points	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
2.00	3	12.5	12.5
3.00	5	20.8	33.3
4.00	4	16.7	50.0
5.00	1	4.2	54.2
6.00	4	16.7	70.8
7.00	2	8.3	79.2
8.00	2	8.3	87.5
9.00	2	8.3	95.8
13.00	1	4.2	100.0
Total	24	100.0	

Just 37.5 percent of Bosnians scored higher than the median score, compared to 75 percent of Kosovars. Gender scores were almost exactly the inverse of one another. Just over 36 percent of men scored below the median score, and 63.6 percent scored higher. Conversely, 61.5 percent of women scored below the median, and 38.5 percent scored higher. Participants also the exact inverse when it came to age. Nearly 42 percent of participants under 34 percent scored below the median U.S. political participation score, and 58.3 percent scored higher. Interestingly, 71.4 percent of participants citing “no religion” scored above the median, and 28.6 percent scored below. This compared to 40.0 percent of Christians with higher than median scores, and 47.7 percent of Muslims. In the over 31 age group, 58.3 percent scored below the median, and 41.7 percent scored above. None of the cross-tabulations between U.S. political participation score and the control variables were statistically significant.

Sending state participation scores were lower than receiving state participation scores. They ranged from spread from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0. The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78. Table 19 contains the spread of all scores.

Table 19 - Conflict Group Mean Political Participation Scores (Sending State)

Points	Frequency	Valid Percent	Cumulative Percent
.00	2	8.3	8.3
1.00	4	16.7	25.0
2.00	5	20.8	45.8
3.00	4	16.7	62.5
4.00	4	16.7	79.2
5.00	3	12.5	91.7
8.00	1	4.2	95.8
13.00	1	4.2	100.0
Total	24	100.0	

As with receiving state participation scores, none of the subsequent cross-tabulations for sending state participation were statistically significant. Bosnians and Kosovars had exactly the same number of participants below and above the median scores – 62.5 percent of both scored below the median, and 37.5 percent above the median. Just over 45.5 percent of men scored below the median score, and 54.5 percent scored higher. Conversely, 76.9 percent of women scored below the median, and 23.1 percent scored higher. Among those under 31 years old, 66.7 percent scored below the median, and 33.3 percent scored higher. In the over 31 age group, 58.3

percent scored below the median and 41.7 percent scored above. The distribution for participants over 31 years old was the same for receiving state participation as it was for U.S. political participation. Nearly 43 percent of participants citing “no religion” scored above the median, and 57.1 percent scored below. This compared to 40.0 percent of Christians with higher than median scores, and 33.3 percent of Muslims. There were no statistically significant associations between the control and receiving state political participation scores.

Summary of Results

In assessing the effects of conflict experience on political participation, I could not reject the null hypothesis. Conflict migrants participated politically more in their receiving state than their sending state for every indicator analyzed, including a comparison of overall mean political participation scores. Table X summarizes results across all political indicators.

Table 20 - Hypothesis 1 Political Indicators Summary

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Sending State</i>	<i>Receiving State</i>
Gathered Information about Politics	92%	96%
Voted in Election	21%	87%
Political Party Affiliation	21%	70%
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party	8%	33%
Contacted Political Figure	16%	21%
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions	33%	36%
Mean Political Participation Score	3.25	5.29

Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion can be drawn simply from the questions asking participants outright where they allocate more activity and which events are most important to them. By participants' own admission, they do not participate more in their sending state than their receiving state, nor were sending state politics more important to them. I summarize these results in Table 21.

Table 21 - Self-Identified Sending/Receiving State Activity (Conflict Group)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Sending State</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Same</i>
More Politically Active Overall*	0	41%	36%
Political Issues Most Important	4%	67%	29%

**This distribution does not total 100%, because 23% of participants indicated that they are not politically active at all in either locale.*

Overall results demonstrate that there is a transnational dimension to political participation for some conflict migrants, but not the majority I had hypothesized. Qualitative interview responses provided some insight into participation patterns, some of which was noteworthy. For instance, almost all participants continued to gather political information about their sending state via Internet news sources, family and friends residing in the sending state, and community organizations.

Participation in such activities as voting and engaging with political parties was less common in the sending state than it was in the receiving state. Having gained additional insight about voting processes from the participants, I was surprised that even 20 percent had cast a sending state vote. Participants expressed a great deal of confusion about their sending state citizenship rights the institutional response to their displacement. There were barriers to accessing information and resources necessary to

vote in their homeland, and some misunderstanding about eligibility. As one Bosnian participant said, “No [I did not vote], but I really wanted to. I tried to vote, but could not.”

Another Bosnian participant described perceptions of sending state Bosnian woman, 28 corruption as being a possible deterrent to casting a vote, In her town, for example, she blamed party politics and cronyism for a government shutdown that occurred in her home city and left many feeling discouraged. She said,

The [United Nations] ambassadors were targeting people living in diaspora, you know, in the U.S. or anywhere, and they had a really low turnout. I think that because of the way things worked out [in the home state], a lot of people were just discouraged. People were telling me, “Why don’t you go vote?” But I’m thinking if I voted, it wouldn’t have really mattered.

Although contact of political officials was low for both the sending and receiving state, I observed that all contact with U.S. officials centered around sending state issues, thus making the action transnational. The only statistically significant relationship was between contact of U.S. political figures and country of origin. Kosovars exhibited higher rates of contact with U.S. officials than Bosnians, and they provided examples of interactions focused on the “Albanian cause” and issues related to Kosovar independence. Regardless of country of origin, gender, religion or age, all of the participants who had contacted a U.S. political figure did so to discuss issues relevant to the sending state. So although the action was initiated within a U.S. political structure, the interaction was undertaken to produce an outcome in the sending state.

A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained her involvement in contacting U.S. political officials to request they intervene in the imprisonment of political prisoners in Montenegro,

We went many times to Washington DC about Kosova, Albania and Montenegro. We are very active as a community. They [political prisoners] been in jail for two years over there, and the reason why they are out is because we did a lot as a community. We initiate the things through [U.S.] government, and government react over there, and they are free now...And we had a lot of community dinners for Wesley Clark and Senator Levin and all them. David Bonior and all of them, they were there. I went on those events all the time. My husband actually went and met Hillary Clinton, too.

A 24-year old Kosovar woman echoed similar interactions, “I’ve met with Debbie Stabenow, Carl Levin and [David] Bonior...I’ve attended some of the rallies of Al Gore’s, when he was running, and I helped out during that time a little bit...It was more for the Albanian cause.” I conducted an anecdotal interview with a Bosnian man who was not meet study criteria. He explained also, “I contacted all of them. These issues were related mostly to the genocide in Bosnia. I got responses – I’m satisfied.”

Nearly as many people attempted to influence sending state political opinions as there were receiving state political opinions. Perhaps most interesting was the pervasive use of Internet-based social networks, email distributions and blogs to shape sending state opinions. I discuss further the use of technology in shaping transnational political action in my concluding chapter. A Bosnian participant in her late-20s explained her rationale for attempting to influence opinions in her sending state,

I think – I mean especially when you’ve lived in another country like the United States that’s so much more organized. It has its negatives of course, but it’s still a very powerful country for a reason. And I think once you’ve seen that, and then you move back to Bosnia or any other country, you just kind of have to get involved because you can’t keep your mouth shut. Because you’ve learned a lot of things here and just kind of feel like you have a voice, and you should have a voice. You know, you just don’t want to be quiet about so many things. So I can see myself getting involved.

Participants who said their political activity was “about the same in both” the sending and receiving states explained their sense of duality about which political events were most important to them. A 41-year old Kosovar woman said,

It’s hard because I love my country. Also, I love United States. They are equally important because I live here, my kids live here, my friends, everybody. But also in Kosovo, I still have family, I still have friends. So equally [important], I could say.

A 23 year-old Kosovar woman explained,

I mean I live here. I want to know more about different things here. But I’m involved also in Kosova politics in different ways...I went to Indiana with the U.S. Army, and I actually prepared the soldiers [for] when they go back to Kosova with language, culture...how to use an interpreter, role-playing...This way, I can help the U.S. and Kosova at the same time.

A female Bosnian participant explained her “about the same” response as well

I think I’m probably more informed about Bosnian politics because I’m constantly reading the newspapers and watching the news and everything. But when it comes to involvement in terms of voting and everything, that’s more here.

Although overall statistical correlations were insignificant, I noted several trends worthy of discussion. For one, older Bosnian women participated in political structures

(sending and receiving state) less so than others. Several commented also on the desire to withdraw from political activity overall. Additionally, participants under 31 years old participated in sending state political structures more than I anticipated given that in most cases they had lived in the United States longer than then they lived in their sending state. I elaborate on gendered transnationalism and generational effects in the final chapter as well.

CHAPTER SIX – COMPARING PARTICIPATION BETWEEN CONFLICT AND NON-CONFLICT GROUPS

In Hypotheses 2, I suggest that conflict-driven migrants will participate in sending state politics more than non-conflict migrants. I proposed also the following research questions in relation to Hypothesis 2:

- *Is there a transnational dimension to political participation for conflict migrants and non-conflict migrants?*
- *Are some conflict migrants more likely than non-conflict migrants to participate in sending state politics post-settlement?*
- *What factors influenced non-conflict migrants' engagement in the sending versus receiving state?*

I suggest that conflict migrants will engage in sending state politics more so than receiving state politics for several reasons. Primarily, non-conflict migrants typically have made advance preparations for relocation such as obtaining English language instruction and lining up housing, educational and employment opportunities. . They also have more financial capital and pre-established connections to family or social support networks. Therefore, non-conflict migrants generally arrive in their receiving community with more social capital than conflict migrants and are better prepared to engage in assimilation processes in the receiving community. This means they are more likely than conflict migrants to incorporate politically in the receiving community. Conflict migrants never intended to leave their home state, so they never had an opportunity to prepare for relocation emotionally, culturally, financially. This may

influence them to take greater stake in sending state politics and remain an active participant in sending state structures after relocation.

Political Indicators

When making comparisons between the conflict group and non-conflict group, I used the same set of political indicators and I used conflict/non-conflict group assignment. Just over 83 percent of the conflict group said there were political issues “of importance to them” compared with 91.7 percent of the non-conflict group. Just over 83 percent of the conflict group said U.S. foreign policy toward their home country was important to them, while every participant in the non-conflict group did. Conflict group status did not predict results. These correlation tables are included in Appendix B.

Comparatively, 95.8 percent of the conflict group used one or more means to obtain information about US politics, and 91.7 percent used one or more means. However, only 16.6 percent of the conflict group used more than one means to gather information about U.S. politics, while 50 percent of the conflict group used more than one means to gather information about sending state politics. So, while slightly more participants gather information about the receiving state, non-conflict participants engage with more U.S.-based information sources than conflict participants. Table 22 contains frequencies.

Table 22 - Means Used to Gather Receiving State Political Information (Between Group)

<i>Number of Means Used</i>	<i>Conflict Group</i>		<i>Non-Conflict Group</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
None	1	4.2	1	8.3
One	19	79.2	5	41.7
Two	2	8.3	4	33.3
Three	2	8.3	2	16.7

With regard to sending state political information gathering, the conflict group and non-conflict group exhibited comparable patterns of behavior. The non-conflict group gathered sending state information with the exact same number of means as they used to gather U.S. political information, and they used slightly more means to do so than the conflict group did. Please see results in Table 23.

Table 23 - Means Used to Gather Sending State Political Information (Between Group)

<i>Number of Means Used</i>	<i>Conflict Group</i>		<i>Non-Conflict Group</i>	
	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>	<i>Frequency</i>	<i>Percent</i>
None	2	8.3	1	8.3
One	14	58.3	5	41.7
Two	6	25.0	4	33.3
Three	2	8.3	2	16.7

Among those eligible to vote (U.S. citizens over 18 years old) 87.0 percent of the conflict group voted in the receiving state, compared with just 37.5 percent of the non-conflict group. Pearson Chi-Square tests demonstrated a statistically significant

relationship between conflict/non-conflict group status and voting in a U.S. Election with $\chi^2(1) = 7.582$ and $p = .006$.

While 20.8 percent of the conflict group voted in the sending state, no one from the non-conflict group did. The relationship between conflict group status and sending state voting was not statistically significant, however. I provide these correlation procedures in Appendix A.

Over 70 percent of the conflict group had a U.S. political party affiliation, compared to 66.7 percent of the non-conflict group. Nearly 20.8 percent of the conflict group affiliated with a sending state party, compared to 16.7 percent of the non-conflict group. Group status was not correlated with either U.S. or sending states political party affiliation.

When it came to contributing money to U.S. candidates, the groups demonstrated equal activism. Within both groups, 33.3 percent of participants contributed to a U.S. candidate or party and 66.7 percent of each group had never made a contribution to a U.S. political candidate or party. The participants who did varied in the frequency of donation: 16.7 percent of the conflict group had contributed once only; 8.3 percent of the non-conflict group had contributed once only; 16.7 percent of each group contributed every one or two years, and 16.7 percent of the non-conflict group contributed more than once a year, while none of the conflict group did. The groups were matched also on their financial contributions to sending state political parties and candidates. In both groups, 91.7 percent had never made a contribution to

a sending state political party (since relocating to the United States), and the remaining 8.3 percent of both groups had. The relationship between conflict group status and contributions to U.S. political parties was not significant.

Contacting a US political figure was higher among non-conflict participants with 20.8 percent of conflict participants contacting a U.S. official, and 58.3 percent of non-conflict participants contacting a U.S. official. Conflict or non-conflict group status was a predictor of contacting U.S. officials with $\chi^2(3) = .505$ and $p = .027$, and $\Lambda = .333$ with $p = .196$. As discovered among the conflict group participants, the non-conflict group also engaged with U.S. political officials to discuss issues relevant to the sending state.

Although twice as many non-conflict participants than non-conflict participants contacted U.S. officials, twice as many people in the conflict group contacted a sending state political figure than the non-conflict group. In the conflict group, 16.7 percent of people contacted a sending state official, compared to just 8.3 percent of the non-conflict group. There were no significant associations between conflict/non-conflict group status and contact with country of origin political figures.

Conflict group members did not use as many means of influencing U.S. political opinions as the non-conflict group. Over 35 percent of the conflict group used one or more methods to influence U.S. political opinions, compared to 41.6 percent of the non-conflict group. Conflict groups used slightly more means than the non-conflict-group, however. The distribution is provided in Table 24. Correlation tests were insignificant.

There were fewer methods used to influence sending state political opinions, overall. Just over 33 percent of conflict group participants used one or more methods of influence, compared to 41.7 percent of non-conflict participants. There were no statistical associations. Table 25 contains these results.

Table 24 - Methods Used to Influence U.S. Opinions (Between Groups)

			Conflict	Non-Conflict	Total
Methods Used to Influence Political Opinions - US	None	Count	15	5	20
		Percent	62.5%	41.7%	55.6%
	One	Count	3	4	7
		Percent	12.5%	33.3%	19.4%
	Two	Count	3	1	4
		Percent	12.5%	8.3%	11.1%
	Three	Count	2	0	2
		Percent	8.3%	.0%	5.6%
	Four	Count	1	0	1
		Percent	4.2%	.0%	2.8%
	Six or more	Count	0	2	2
		Percent	.0%	16.7%	5.6%
Total		Count	24	12	36
		Percent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Table 25 - Methods Used to Influence Sending State Opinions (Between Groups)

			Conflict	Non-Conflict	Total
			None	Count	16
Methods Used to Influence Political Opinions - COO	None	Percent	66.7%	58.3%	63.9%
		Count	4	3	7
	One	Percent	16.7%	25.0%	19.4%
		Count	3	2	5
	Two	Percent	12.5%	16.7%	13.9%
		Count	1	0	1
	Three	Percent	4.2%	.0%	2.8%
		Count	24	12	36
Total	Percent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	

When it came to being politically active pre- and post-migration, no one in the non-conflict group said they were never really active, which differs from the conflict group. When excluding cases where the participant was a young child at the time of migration, 23.1 percent of the conflict group said they were more active before migration, 23.1 percent were more active after migration, and 15.4 percent said they had the same level of involvement. Every person in the non-conflict group who migrated as an adult said they were more politically active after migrating to the United States. The association between group and level of activity was not significant, however.

When I asked participants whether they were currently more politically active in their sending or receiving state, results were mixed. Both groups had the same

percentage of participants who said they were more active in the United States. More non-conflict participants than conflict participants selected “about the same.” However, tests did not reveal statistical significance between conflict group status and political activity. Only one person in the entire study population said they were more active in their sending state. I provide cross-tabulation procedures in Table 26.

Table 26 - Political Activity in the Sending and Receiving State (Between Groups)

			Conflict	Non-Conflict	Total
More Politically Active in US or Country of Origin	US	Count	10	5	15
		Percent	41.7%	41.7%	41.7%
	Country of Origin	Count	0	1	1
		Percent	.0%	8.3%	2.8%
	About the same in both	Count	9	2	11
		Percent	37.5%	16.7%	30.6%
	Not active in either	Count	5	4	9
		Percent	20.8%	33.3%	25.0%
	Total	Count	24	12	36
		Percent	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

More participants from the non-conflict group said sending state politics were more important or held about the same importance to them as U.S. politics. Within the conflict group, 33 percent said sending state issues were of the same or more importance to them than receiving state issues, compared to 58.4 percent of the non-conflict group. The relationship between conflict status and political issues of importance was statistically insignificant.

A Bosnian woman described why sending state issues held equal importance to receiving state issues for her,

Well, my dream is to come back there and live there....I have a lot of friends and family members there, and they've just been through so much that I wish everything would be 100 percent, and everybody would have a job, and everybody's life would be just wonderful. They deserve that after everything they've gone through. And then here [is important] obviously because I live here, and I can't say that I'm 100 percent completely disconnected from what's going on here because I've been here for 16 years, and whether I like it or not I'm involved.

I conducted an interview with a 45-year old Albanian man who could not be included in the quantitative analysis, because he did not meet study criteria. However, he provided an interesting anecdotal response. He indicated that he was more politically active in the affairs of Montenegro than the United States. He said,

Because over there it's still not right. Things still need to be done...I don't mean anymore uprising like we did in Kosova through the war. Now we do it through the democratic and human rights channels.

So, while he is from Albania and resides in the United States, he actually felt his greatest level of political involvement was in a third state in which he felt a strong to ethnic "kin" in need of advocates abroad. I touch on this theme once more in Chapter 7 as it is a recurring anecdotal result throughout the analysis.

Comparing Conflict and Non-Conflict Group Political Participation Scores

Actual U.S. participation scores for the conflict group spread from 2 to 13 points, with the median score being 4.5 and standard deviation of 2.75. The mean score was

5.29. Sending state scores ranged from 0 to 13 points, with the median score being 3.0. The mean score was 3.25, and the standard deviation was 2.78. United States political participation scores for the non-conflict group had a broader range from 0-16. The median score was 5.5, and the mean score was 6.58 with a standard deviation of 4.69. Non-conflict group scores for the sending state ranged from 0-7. The median score was 2.0, and the mean score was 3.08 with a standard deviation of 2.57.

Summary of Between-Group Results

I summarize between group political results in Tables 27 and 28.

Table 27 - Summary of Political Indicators (Between Group)

<i>Sending State Indicator</i>	<i>Conflict Group</i>	<i>Non-Conflict Group</i>
Gathered Information about Politics	92%	92%
Voted in Election	20%	0
Political Party Affiliation	21%	17%
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party	8%	8%
Contacted Political Figure	17%	8%
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions	32%	41%
Mean Political Participation Score	3.25	3.08

Table 28 – Self-Identified Sending State Activity (Between Group)

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Conflict Group</i>	<i>Non-Conflict Group</i>
More Politically Active in Sending State	0	8%
Same Activity in Sending and Receiving State	38%	17%
Sending State Political Issues Most Important	4%	17%
Sending/Receiving Issues Equally Important	29%	42%

Although outcomes were close, there were some key differences between groups. For one, 20% of the conflict group voted in the sending state, while no one in the non-conflict group did. This supports the hypothesis that conflict migrants will act in the sending state more so than non-conflict migrants. This was interesting considering that the non-conflict group displayed nearly double the rate of dual citizenship that the conflict group did. I suggest the non-conflict group had a higher rate of citizenship due to confusion within the conflict group over how to maintain citizenship and among some, a degree of fear about maintaining citizenship in the home state while it was rife with conflict and instability. The non-conflict group overall appeared to have been better advised of their right to maintain dual citizenship, and they frequently did not support home country property ownership and to maintain a passport for frequent travel back to the home state.

The conflict group also had a slightly higher rate of sending state political party affiliation and contact with sending state political figures. However, the difference was very small. The “attempted to influence political opinions” indicator produced contradictory results for the sending state analysis. The non-conflict group had a higher rate of contact with sending state officials than the conflict group. This coincided also to a high rate of contact with U.S. officials regarding sending state issues. Anecdotal support overall lent insight to Albanian political contact on behalf of the sending state. For example, a 31-year old male participant described a typical interaction,

The first step would be to just get in touch with officials, okay. If we get in touch with them, we request further explanation of what do they think over certain issues. If they would give us an explanation, through that explanation they give us, we would understand from where they are coming from. And then, maybe we can intervene if they are misled over something. Because what we actually are looking for is just to make sure that like the situation is treated fairly, okay.

For example, the participant mentioned above said,

Actually it [contact] was during Kosovo conflict, and it was mainly the local congressman to try to intervene and pass the resolution to intervene in Kosovo, because it was very bad ethnic cleansing.

Another participant, a 52 year old Albanian man elaborated on the interaction as well. He said,

Starting from senators, okay, and the Governor's office, we have been more than six-seven times a year. And the state level too – senators of the state of Michigan, congressmen, all those people...In July we are having an event for Gary Peters, and also we're blessed because Wesley Clark is coming to that event. And actually I got a letter that Gary Peters sent, because we have a grievance in Montenegro that is unacceptable...I received a [copy of a] letter that he sent to the President and Prime Minister of Montenegro.

An anecdotal interview I conducted with a 45-year old Albanian man provided a description of a similar interaction,

My opinion is that U.S. should get deeply involved to tell them [Albanian government] what democracy is in U.S., and to tell them that those [Albanian] ethnic groups need to be treated the same in Montenegro. That's why I went with the [U.S.] Congress people in 2005 to Montenegro, and we spoke with all high-level Prime Minister and President and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro...And that's why

Congressman Eliot Engel came with us and told them that they need to have municipality of Tuzi, self-determination for those areas, so they need to have full municipality so they can control their own territories, their own government, and police...But they can have full municipality of Tuzi – that’s major project we got right now.

A 46 year old Kosovar woman and her husband owned an Albanian-centric radio station for 11 years. She describes their efforts to influence opinions in the sending and receiving state,

Me and my husband own radio for 11 years – now we don’t have...A lot was going on in Kosova. I used to read news, and my husband was making all the programs, and he was the host. It was political news. We interview everybody...We met a lot of people here in Michigan and from there [Kosovo] too – everybody who came to visit United States, we interviewed them. It was interesting because it was a lot of issues discussing a lot of things in community, over there, what going on here...My husband say they are fighting and giving their life [Kosovars], and we have to do something, and we did that. We put on the radio all those community events, what they were doing, how they helping people over there like donating money and clothes and everything to send there during the war. It was big help during the war, especially. We helped them a lot for any kind of information for immigration, health, where they can find like free clinics, free doctors.”

A 24 year old Kosovar woman describes a U.S. protest she attended regarding the imprisonment of prisoners in Montenegro,

The protest was about wanting a fair trial for Montenegrins suspected of terrorism in Montenegro – domestic terrorism. This was a protest for the U.S. government to ask Montenegro for a fair trial of the Albanians, who three of them were U.S. citizens. It was a protest in D.C. We wanted to make sure that the U.S. required and asked and pressured the Montenegro government to give a fair and speedy trial to the 14 that

were accused, three of which were U.S. citizens. So we were kind of riding on those three backs to get the same treatment for all 14.

As these examples illustrate, the Albanian and Kosovar contact with sending and receiving state political officials was less influenced by country of origin and more so by a shared sense of “cause” around issues affecting not only the home state, but ethnic kin in states throughout the sending region.

CHAPTER SEVEN – CONCLUSIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Climbing international migration rates and enhanced modes of social and political engagement across migrant populations have rendered transnational political participation an increasingly salient issue. International migration has always held questions up for scholars' examination as immigrants have always maintained ties back to the homeland via kinship networks, financial remittances, and some political influence. However, widespread allowance of dual citizenship coupled with the up-to-the minute information gathering and engagement proffered by technological advancements allow today's migrants to assume more organized and influential transnational political roles than ever before. Additionally, this influence challenges our notions of political space and traditional definitions of the nation-state as a bounded political entity.

International migration has far-reaching domestic and international policy effects, one of which lies in the political decision-making of the migrants themselves. Once departed the homeland, do migrants continue to act politically in their sending state, or do they abandon their former trappings in order to become engaged in their new receiving community? How do these choices vary depending on the conditions of departure? Specifically, how does transnational political behavior differ between forced and voluntary migrants?

Wood (1994) suggests that forced and voluntary migrants have similar experiences and produce similar patterns of transnational political behavior. However, others (Kunz, 1973; Richmond, 1993, etc.) suggest that the condition of “involuntariness” experienced by forced migrants produces both emotional and practical effects that steer political practice. Specifically, sudden departure leaves forced migrants with less social and financial capital than voluntary migrants. They typically have not had opportunities to gain the language instruction, job training, or access to new networks that normally aid in assimilation and foster later political engagement in the receiving community. As such, I suggest that conflict migrants are more likely to participate politically in their sending state than their receiving state post-resettlement. I also propose a second hypothesis suggesting that conflict migrants participate more than non-conflict migrants in sending state politics post-resettlement.

In comparing political indicators between two conflict groups and also between conflict and non-conflict groups, I found that Levitt et al (2003) most aptly sum up the state of transnational practice among today’s many migrant groups. They write,

...not all migrants are engaged in transnational practices and that those who are, do so with considerable variation in the sectors, levels, strength, and formality of their involvement. Similarly, the levels of transmigrant activities also vary. The links between migrant associations and their home towns, or church-to-church ties between sending and receiving communities, are often aimed at establishing very specific and local (what some call "translocal") connections. But for some groups, transnational practices are no longer about affirming identities to a specific place, but instead about their enduring membership in broader ethnic, religious or occupational groups...

As such, the type and level of transnational activity certainly varied across interview participants. Within my examination of Hypothesis 1, I compared political indicators for activity in the sending and receiving state and also a comparison of mean participation scores. To re-summarize the sending and receiving state indicators:

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Sending State</i>	<i>Receiving State</i>
Gathered Information about Politics	92%	96%
Voted in Election	21%	87%
Political Party Affiliation	21%	70%
Contributed Money to Political Candidate/Party	8%	33%
Contacted Political Figure	16%	21%
Attempted to Influence Political Opinions	33%	36%
Mean Political Participation Score	3.25	5.29

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>Sending State</i>	<i>US</i>	<i>Same</i>
More Politically Active Overall*	0	41%	36%
Political Issues Most Important	4%	67%	29%

These results did not lend support to my hypothesis that conflict migrants would participate more in the sending state than in the receiving state. I think that participation was skewed more toward the receiving state for several reasons. For one, conflict participants noted confusion over dual citizenship opportunities, access to sending state voting and other mechanisms of sending state participation. Many simply did not know how to participate effectively, even if they had a desire to do so. Others indicated simply that as citizens of the United States, they felt it appropriate, and at times necessary, to become a part of the U.S. political structure. Additionally, there were several conflict participants who indicated a desire to withdraw from sending state

politics due to the negative associations produced by their conflict experience and a general fear and mistrust of the sending state structure. As Wahlbeck (1999) and Kelly (2003) suggest, conflict often destroys and distorts old sending state political ties for departed migrants. And as Frykman (2001) argues, sometimes conflict migrants become more involved in the receiving state than the sending state, because they have simply had enough. Open-ended interview responses support these assertions. For example, I asked a 25-year old male Bosnian participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen of Bosnia?” He replied,

Not really, because this is where I live now. I mean I will always go back and everything. I’m always going to be a Bosnian. But even though most of my [extended] family is there, I’m here with my dad and my mom. But I pretty much grew up here. I like it here. I mean I like it there too, but it’s too much trauma for my parents there and everything. I mean we’re happy here, you know.

A 46-year old Kosovar woman explained also,

Because when I lost my country, I left my country. I wanted to live somewhere where it’s more secure, and where my child has a future. Getting citizenship, you feel like you belong to that country, and you work for that...

A 35 year old Bosnian woman explained her reasoning for straying away from sending state politics as well. She said,

I think both [sending and receiving state politics are important], although I try to keep myself away as much as I can from Bosnian politics. All I know about Bosnian politics is actually through my husband, because he’s the one that keeps up. I try not to read anything that would kind of disturb, and I tell him not to tell me bad things. He’s sometimes

encouraging in his words or discouraging in his words about what is happening in Bosnia. So generally, both, but for some reason it is easier for me to be aware of things that happen here than in Bosnia.

A 50 year old Bosnian woman described her withdrawal as well, highlighting both a lack of faith in the “old” system as well as her emotional aversion to remaining involved. She said,

After I left my country, I made a decision. I made a promise, and I didn't break it. I would never watch the news or politics again. Sometimes my husband or my soon try to get me into it, but I am out very fast. Basically, that's my decision and so far I've survived. For me, watching the TV here is a waste of time. I am so used to our old system, it is still in me that I just don't want to. I tell my husband that if there is a war, then let me know. Don't get me wrong, it doesn't necessarily mean that I don't know about politics. I studied it. I finished law school. I know how everything functions. I am well-informed, but I do not think it is a good thing for my health.

Although the population was too small to draw a representative statistical conclusion, most anecdotal withdrawal sentiments were expressed by women. Mahler (83) discusses gendered results when examining transnational activity, “Men may dominate transnational fields with respect to women in their households. Often planning activities, taking the lead in transnational overtures, and at times, steering the direction of their spouses' and/or family's transnational relationships.” This seemed to be the case at times, but more so it seemed to be more closely tied to anxiety over the departure experience and a desire to disassociate from the trauma of having endured conflict and systemic collapse.

Will children of transmigrants opt to forge a transnational life? How will this differ from their parents? First generation professionals frequently maintain transnational social and familial ties, because they have more social and financial capital with which to travel back and forth. (Portes and Rumbault, 2006:26) Do transnational practices vary along generational lines? But Portes and Rumbaut (1990) suggest that cultural practices and values become steadily “whittle away” from generation to generation, such that third generation migrants scarcely resemble their grandparents in their social, cultural and political practices.

Portes and Rumbault (2006: 199) suggest that because of the initial confrontation of language barriers and cultural differences, first generation immigrants often “lack voice.” Nativist campaigns against first generation immigrants often spawn retaliatory attitudes in the second generation. “More attuned to American culture and fluent in English, the offspring of immigrants have gained ‘voice’ and have used it to reaffirm identities attacked previously with so much impunity.”

However, when examining Kosovar activity in conjunction with Albanian activity, transnational efforts were linked more to a shared ethnic status and a desire to right perceived wrongs committed against the broader ethnic group or a kin state. Poulton, (1997: 285) defines “kin state” as “a state composed of and governed by a majority community, for which groups who reside outside the state’s sovereign territory

maintain a strong affinity as a result of shared ethnicity, culture, religion, language or perceived history.”

Where there’s a shared kinship, what else doesn’t matter?

Shared ethnicity/kinship undermined effects of conflict

The relationship between country of origin and U.S. political contact was significant at $\chi^2(3) = .698, p = .011$.

Citizenship and Repatriation

Among Conflict Group participants who were U.S. citizens, reported reasons for obtaining U.S. citizenship included the ease of travel and the perceived protection afforded by traveling with a U.S. passport. A 25-year old Bosnian man elaborated “I live here – I pretty much grew up here. I’m Bosnian, but still I mean I grew up here. It’s my country too, now, you know. And plus, it’s powerful – whenever you go travel, you show the U.S. passport, you know, you don’t need no visa or nothing. They treat you differently.”

However, several participants obtained U.S. citizenship for reasons related to their specific circumstance as conflict survivors. I engaged in several anecdotal conversations about “citizenship” and what it’s like to “feel like a citizen” of one country or another. Some participants still felt connected to their homeland as citizens, and others felt more detached. For example, I asked a 25-year old male Bosnian participant, “Do you still feel, in a sense, like a citizen of Bosnia?” He replied, “Not

really, because this is where I live now. I mean I will always go back and everything. I'm always going to be a Bosnian. But even though most of my [extended] family is there, I'm here with my dad and my mom. But I pretty much grew up here. I like it here. I mean I like it there too, but it's too much trauma for my parents there and everything. I mean we're happy here, you know."

I conducted an anecdotal interview with a 45 year old Albanian male who did not meet study criteria, because he migrated to the United States in 1980. He explained his rationale about citizenship status by saying, "That's the only citizenship I got now, because I don't have any other countries. I'm not Yugoslavian – I was born in Yugoslavia, but I'm Albanian. And we don't have no Albanian citizenship in Yugoslavia – you have to become Yugoslavian citizenship."

Technology

26 year old Bosnian woman started a non-profit after interacting with people she had a dialogue with on an Internet website that was "targeting" people from her city. The site included news, photos and a chat forum. Formal relationships were not far behind. She said,

We got to know each other pretty well and just started thinking that maybe we should start doing something to help out. And then we got some money together and registered the agency as a nonprofit over there [in Bosnia]. We've been helping – not doing too much – maybe 2-3 times a year, but we would some money – and work with people that are living there to find somebody that needs help.

I asked her if the interaction was largely personal or virtual, and she responded, “I see them [the other group members] when I’m in Bosnia. I’m there almost every summer...But it’s been really challenging because everything that we do is online. If want to meet to make a decision, we’re on the MSN Messenger talking to each other.” Members of their group hail from the United States, Western Europe, Australia and Canada. I asked her whether she considered the group to be politically active in Bosnia. She said, “Well we’re trying to be not political at all. We don’t want to get involved in that.”

30 year old Bosnian Male : Do you ever send money back to support any projects in your home country?

Not really. I support only – it’s a group called – it’s not political, but it’s like young people basically – it’s a movement – Revolt. It’s on Facebook – I can send you some or email you. Just find me, my first name and last name, and then Detroit, and that’s where it is. It’s just basically young people criticizing all this bullshit that’s going on as far as politics on there, you know, like police doing what the fuck they wanna do, politicians doing what the fuck they wanna do, you know, this and that. You know, they want a little bit better for the people, I guess, start moving forward basically. It’s basically people in Bosnia, just throughout the whole Bosnia. Like it’s young people, between 18-30, maybe, you see what I’m saying? It’s basically what they do is criticize all this, you know, they want a little bit better for the people. Like crimes, this and that, like police not doing nothing about it. They’re not putting in so much work as they should and stuff like that.

Anecdotal Bosnian man over 50→

I offend them at least once a week...They have nightmares. I make sure that they're not comfortable. We established an organization, and it was established during the war. I wouldn't call it dissident because dissidents, they fight. I don't know how to define it – we are not struggling to take power. All what we are doing, we are trying to politically educate Bosnians so that they have an understanding of what is taking place. Part of the culture is that anything what is going on national level is decide by the powers – USA power, that power, this power...So we developed a game. Whenever they [state powers] would make a move, we would just explain [to Bosnians] what it means...We do that through the Internet. We have two lists – one is in English, the other is in Bosnian. And in English, it is not just Bosnians – it is for American public.

Goldring elaborates further, "...transnational social fields, and localities of origin in particular, provide a special context in which people can improve their social position, and perhaps their power, make claims about their changing status and have it appropriately valorized, and also participate in changing their place of origin so that it becomes more consistent with their changing expectations and statuses..." (Goldring, 1998: 167) this has been shown to lend leverage to leaders who are able to succeed in a transnational space more so than the community of origin.

Future Directions

Communist/failed state

Political space/place

Refugee status matters w Bosnians, not as much w Kosovars...

Portes et al 1999 AS QUOTED IN KIVISTO 2001...."Those with higher levels of social capital would be more likely to forge transnational linkages than those with less capital..."

Despite globalization's destabilization of the notion of states as free-standing entities, Glick Schiller et al (1992) point out that the nation-state persists as the primary structure by which we organize and govern. Brubaker (1996: 14) defines a nation as "collective individuals capable of coherent, purposeful collective action." Conceptualizing transnationalism requires developing some understanding of nationalist loyalty as an organizing principle, even when those loyalties transcend traditional state boundaries. To be sure, even in a transnational existence, action is formed first around the national, whether encouraged by the state or sought out by the individual. Brubaker (1996: 5) writes of "transborder nationalisms" as being these "external national homelands" that establish obligations and responsibilities transcendent of geographic boundaries and legal citizenship. Yet, globalization and transnationalism do challenge traditional concepts of the nation-state. Questions of jurisdiction, overlapping institutions and citizenship are not easily answered.

Appendix A – Hypothesis One Correlation Tables

Conflict Group: U.S. Political Information Gathering

<i>Control</i>	<i>Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significant if p<.01</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significant if p<.05</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State	.480	.137	.250	.140	3
Gender	.348	.406	.091	.827	3
Religion	.457	.123	.250	.064	6
Age at Interview	.478	.140	.333	.363	3

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Information Gathering

<i>Control</i>	<i>Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State	.299	.543	.000	n/a	3
Gender	.617	.028	.545	.090	3
Religion	.520	.043	.250	.064	6
Age at Interview	.602	.039	.300	.261	3

Conflict Group: U.S. Voting

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi-Square Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significant if ></i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significant if <.05</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State	.014	.907	n/a	n/a	1

Gender	.755	.385	n/a	n/a	1
Religion	.257	.468	.000	n/a	2
Age at Interview	.491	.484	n/a	n/a	1

Conflict Group: Sending State Voting

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State	.505	.477	n/a	n/a	1
Gender	.511	.475	n/a	n/a	1
Religion	.266	.428	.000	n/a	2
Age at Interview	.253	.615	n/a	n/a	1

Conflict Group: Receiving State Political Party

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State					1
Gender	.509	.476			1
Religion	.278	.394	.000	n/a	2
Age at Interview	.0202	.653			1

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Party

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
----------------	-----------------------------------	---------------------	---------------	---------------------	-----------

	<i>Cramer's V</i>				
Sending State	.505	.477			1
Gender	.087	.769			1
Religion	.266	.428	.000	n/a	2
Age at Interview	2.274	.132			1

Conflict Group: Receiving State Political Contribution

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State					
Gender					
Religion					
Age at Interview					

Conflict Group: Sending State Political Contribution

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Sending State					
Gender					
Religion					
Age at Interview					

Conflict Group: Influence U.S. Political Opinions

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Country of Origin	.395	.441	.125	.307	4
Gender	.365	.527	.273	.307	4
Religion	.473	.216	.250	1.852	8
Age at Interview	.516	.171	.333	.337	4

Conflict Group: Influence Sending State Political Opinions

<i>Control</i>	<i>Chi Square/ Cramer's V</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>Lambda</i>	<i>Significance</i>	<i>df</i>
Country of Origin	.464	.161	.250	.307	3
Gender	.365	.363	.273	.244	3
Religion	.427	.188	.250	.244	6
Age at Interview	.421	.236	.250	.064	3

Correlation Tests: Politically Active Before or After Migration

Control	Cramer's V	Significance	Lambda	Significance	df
Country of Origin	.581	.222	.250	.559	3

Gender	.380	.599	.200	.652	3
Religion	.884	.118	.571	.067	6
Age at Interview	.527	.307	.000	n/a	3

Correlation Tests: Politically Active in Sending or Receiving State

Control	Cramer's V	Significance	Lambda	Significance	df
Country of Origin	.079	.928	.000	n/a	2
Gender	.495	.053	.273	.487	2
Religion	.241	.594	.000	.000	4
Age at Interview	.310	.315	.250	.163	0

Correlation Tests: Sending or Receiving State Issues Most Important

Control	Cramer's V	Significance	Lambda	Significance	df
Country of Origin					
Gender					
Religion					
Age at Interview					

Appendix B – Hypothesis Two Correlation Tables

Sending State Political Issues are Important to Me

Control	Cramer's V	Significance	Lambda	Significance	df
Conflict/Non-Conflict Group	.138	.708	.000	n/a	1

Sending State Foreign Policy is Important to Me

Control	Chi-Square	Significance	Lambda	Significance	df
Conflict/Non-Conflict Group	2.250	.134	.000	n/a	1

Appendix C – Instrumentation

Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants
Face-to-Face Interview Guide
Wayne State University

Hello, my name is Amanda Hanlin, and I am a student at Wayne State University. I am trying to learn more about how people born in other countries adjust to living in the United States. I am hoping you can help me by answering some questions about your views on citizenship and politics both in the United States and in your home country.

Before we begin, I just wanted to go over some important points. First, this interview is completely voluntary. You can refuse to participate, and you do not have to answer any questions you do not want to answer. You can end this interview at any time. Also, your answers will be kept completely confidential. I will not use your name at all when I review the results of the interview.

I would like to first ask you some questions about your background.

1. *CODE WITHOUT ASKING* Male 1 Female 2

2. In what city and country were you born?

3. Would you consider the town in which you were born to be URBAN or RURAL?

Urban 1
Rural 2
Suburb 3
Don't know 4

4. In what city and country were you at the time that you first migrated?

5. Would you consider the town in which you were at the time of your migration to be URBAN or RURAL?

Urban 1
Rural 2
Suburb 3
Don't know 4

6. What year did you come to the United States?

7. Have you lived in the United States ever since [year]?

Yes 1
No 2

8. Which of these categories best describes your status when you came to the U.S. in [date]?

Permanent Resident 1
Temporary Resident 2
Without Papers 3
Temporary Work Visa 4
Student Visa 5
Tourist Visa 6
Dependent on someone else's visa 7
Expired visa 8
Asylee 9
Temporary Protected Immigrant (TPS) 10
Other (specify) _____ 11

9. Are you a U.S. citizen currently?

Yes 1
No 2

If yes → 9a. What year did you become a U.S. citizen?

If yes → 9b. How long did it take you to obtain citizenship (in years)?

If yes → 9c. Why did you decide to pursue U.S. citizenship?

If no → 9d. Do you plan to become a U.S. citizen?

Yes 1
No 2

Open-ended follow up → 9e. Why or why not?

10. Are you still a citizen of your home country?

Yes 1
No 2

11. Do you still own property in your home country?

Yes 1
No 2

12. Since you left your home country, how many times have you been back to visit?

13. How many of your parents still live in your home country?

14. How many of your parents live in the United States?

15. How many of your children live in your home country?

16. How many of your children live in the United States?

17. How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in your home country?

18. How many of your brothers and sisters currently live in the United States?

19. How about your friends? Would you say that you have more friends living in the U.S. or living in your home country?

- | | |
|----------------------------------|---|
| More in U.S. | 1 |
| More in home country | 2 |
| About the same in both locations | 3 |
| Don't know | 4 |

20. Since you moved to the US, have you sent money back to friends or family in your home country?

- | | |
|-----|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |

If yes → 20a. About how often?

- | | |
|------------------------|----|
| Once only | 1 |
| Every one or two years | 2 |
| About once a year | 3 |
| More than once a year | 4 |
| Don't Know | 98 |
| Refused | 99 |

21. Do you ever send money back to support any projects in your home country?

- | | |
|-----|---|
| Yes | 1 |
| No | 2 |

If yes → 21a. About how often?

- | | |
|------------------------|---|
| Once only | 1 |
| Every one or two years | 2 |

About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

22. In your own words, please tell me why you decided to move to the United States.

23. If you had to pick the statement that most fits your PRIMARY reason for relocating to the United States, which of these categories best describes the PRIMARY reason why you came to the United States? Please choose **only one** response.

To find work	1
To reunite with family	2
To get an education	3
To get a "better life" overall	4
Fled from conflict	5
Fled political persecution	6
Fled religious persecution	7
Other (please specify)	8

24. Using the same series of statements, what (if any) would be the next best statement to describe what most influenced you to move to the United States? Please choose **only one** response.

To find work	1
To reunite with family	2
To get an education	3
To get a "better life" overall	4
Fled from conflict	5
Fled political persecution	6
Fled religious persecution	7
Other (please specify)	8

25. Would you ever consider moving back to your home country?

25a. Why or why not?

Now I'd like to ask for your thoughts and opinions about things related to politics and citizenship. Please remember that there are no right or wrong answers. I'm really just interested in listening to your opinions in your own words.

26. Are there any political issues that are important to you? Can you tell me about them?

27. Would you say you were a more politically active person before or after you migrated to the United States?

Before	1
After	2
About the same level of involvement in both	3
Was never politically active	4
Don't know	5

27a. How come?

28. Today, are you more politically active with regard to U.S. political affairs or the political affairs of your home country?

U.S.	1
Home Country	2
About the same level of involvement in both	3
Not active in either	4
Don't know	5

28a. How come?

29. Which political events (elections, policy change, etc.) are more important to you currently – those of the United States, or those of your home country?

U.S.	1
Home Country	2
About the same importance	3
Neither are important to me	4
Don't know	5

29a. How come?

30. Do you take interest in US foreign policy with regard to your home country?

If yes → 30a. Can you tell me a little bit about what interests you?

Now, I'd like to ask you how often you have participated in certain political and community activities. For all of these, just give me your best estimate, and don't worry that you might not remember the exact number of times you participated in each activity.

31. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in the United States to relay your views on some issue?

Yes	1
No	2

If yes → 31a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

31b. Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words?

32. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contacted any political figure (elected official, bureaucrat, local leader, etc.) in your home country to relay your views on some issue?

Yes	1
No	2

If yes → 32a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

32b. Can you tell me more about this interaction in your own words?

33. Do you identify yourself with any U.S. political party?

Yes	1
No	2

If yes → 33a. Would you say you are...

Democrat	1
Republican	2
Independent	3
Other (please specify)	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

34. Do you identify yourself with any political party in your home country?

Yes	1
-----	---

No 2

If yes → 34a. Which party would that be?

35. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to U.S. political candidates or parties?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	98
Refused	99

If yes → 35a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

36. Since you relocated to the United States, have you contributed money to political candidates or parties in your home country?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	98
Refused	99

If yes → 36a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

37. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any local, state or federal U.S election?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	98
Refused	99

If yes → 37a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

38. Since you relocated to the United States, have you voted in any election in your home country?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	98
Refused	99

If yes → 38a. How often would you say you did this?

Once only	1
Every one or two years	2
About once a year	3
More than once a year	4
Don't Know	98
Refused	99

39. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence anyone's opinions about politics? In this case, I'm interested in how you've communicated with people living in the United States. Please select ALL that apply.

Letter	1
Email	2
Internet Blog	3
Phone Call	4
Boycott some business or product	5
Other (please specify)	6

39a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?

40. Since you relocated to the United States, have you used any of these means to influence people's opinions about politics? In this case, I'm interested in how you've communicated with people living in your home country. Please select ALL that apply.

Letter	1
--------	---

Email	2
Internet Blog	3
Phone Call	4
Boycott some business or product	5
Other (please specify)	6

40a. Can you tell me a little bit more about that?

41. Can you tell me in your own words about any other ways you have participated in political activities in the United States since you moved here?

42. How about in your home country? Can you tell me about any other ways you have participated in political activities in your home country since you moved here?

43. Do you interact with any civic, cultural or social organizations? These can be based in the United States or in your home country.

Yes	1
No	2

If yes → 43a. Which ones?

If yes → 43b. Can you tell me more about your involvement?

44. Are there any organizations that supported your move to the United States?

Yes	1
No	2
Not sure	98
Refused	99

If yes → (44a) Which ones?

If yes → (44b) In what way did they support you?

45. How do you gather information about U.S. politics? Please select all that apply.

Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)	1
Friends and/or family	2
Community Organizations	3
Other (please specify)	4
I do not gather information about U.S. politics	5

If yes → (45a) Can you be more specific about those sources?

46. How do you gather information about politics in your home country? Please select all that apply.

Public information (radio, newspaper, television, websites, etc.)	1
Friends and/or family	2
Community Organizations	3
Other (please specify)	4
I do not gather information about politics in my home country	5

If yes → (46a) Can you be more specific about those sources?

47. If you belong to a particular religion or faith, what is it?

1. Baptist
2. Buddhist
3. Christian (Protestant, Catholic, Roman Catholic, Greek, Orthodox, Mormon, etc.)
4. Hindu
5. Jewish
6. Muslim
7. Agnostic
8. Atheist
9. Religious, but does not belong to a particular religion
10. No religion
11. Other religion (SPECIFY)

48. What is the highest grade or year of school or college you completed in your home country?

No formal schooling	99
Elementary School (1-5)	1
Middle School (6-8)	2
High School (9-12)	3
1 year of college	4
2 years of college	5
3 years of college	6
4 years of college	7
5 or more years of college	8

If advanced study → 48a. What was your course of study?

49. How many years of school have you completed in the United States?

No U.S. schooling	99
Attended some schooling in U.S. but didn't complete a grade or year	0
Elementary School (1-5)	1
Middle School (6-8)	2

High School (9-12)	3
1 year of college	4
2 years of college	5
3 years of college	6
4 years of college	7
5 or more years of college	8

If advanced study → 49a. What was your course of study?

50. When you first moved to the United States, did you speak English?

Yes	1
No	2

51. How would you describe your current employment status?

Working	1
Looking for work	2
Keeping house	3
Going to school	4
Unable to work	5
Retired	6
Other _____	7

52. What is your annual salary at this job in US dollars?

Unemployed	0
Less than \$25,000	1
\$25,000 to \$35,000	2
\$35,000 to \$45,000	3
\$45,000 to \$55,000	4
\$55,000 to \$65,000	5
\$65,000 or more	6

53. How would you describe your employment status before you left your home country?

Working	1
Looking for work	2
Keeping house	3
Going to school	4
Unable to work	5
Retired	6
Other _____	7

54. What was your annual salary in US dollars at the time that you left this job in your home country?

Unemployed	0
Less than \$25,000	1
\$25,000 to \$35,000	2
\$35,000 to \$45,000	3
\$45,000to \$55,000	4
\$55,000 to \$65,000	5
\$65,000 or more	6

55. What year were you born?

56. What is your current marital status?

Single	1
Married	2
Widow	3
Other	4

57. Can you suggest other people who maybe willing to be contacted for interview?

Appendix D – Study Recruitment Materials

WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

Dear Sir/Madam,

As a doctoral candidate in Wayne State University's (WSU) Department of Political Science, I am conducting a study to better understand how individuals born outside of the United States view and participate in politics here and abroad. I am gathering research information by interviewing individuals who relocated to Metropolitan Detroit from other countries.

Your insights on these issues are important, and so I hope to include you as a participant in this study. I am asking to schedule a personal interview with you at a location of your choice. The interview will last approximately thirty minutes and will be of no financial cost to you. Your interview responses will be kept completely confidential and reported in aggregate for research purposes only. Your participation in this study is voluntary, and you may withdraw at any time.

I will contact you again within the next few days. In the meantime, if you have any questions or concerns, please contact me directly at 313-516-9633 or achanlin@wayne.edu. I really look forward to speaking with you, and I hope I can count on your participation.

Thank you for your consideration.

Sincerely,

Amanda Hanlin

WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

[ALBANIAN]

I nderuar Zoteri/Zonje

Si nje kandidate per te mbrojtur Doktoraturen ne Shkenca Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State, une jam duke bere nje studim per te kuptuar me mire, se si individet e lindur jashte Shteteve te Bashkuara te Amerikes marrin pjese ne politiken Amerikane dhe ate jashte saj. Une po mbledh informacione kerkimore duke intervistuar personat e ardhur ne Detroit.

Mendimet tuaja per keto ceshtje jane te rendesishme prandaj dhe une shpresoj qe dhe ju te merrni pjese ne kete studim. Po kerkoj qe te leme nje takim se bashku, ne vendin qe deshironi ju, per nje interviste personale (bisede). Intervista do te zgjase per rreth 30 minuta, dhe nuk do te kete asnje kosto financiare per ju. Pergjigjet tuaja do te jene konfidenciale, dhe do te raportohen ne grumbull per qellime kerkimore. Pjesemarrja juaj ne kete fushe eshte vullnetare, dhe ju mund ta lini intervisten ne c'do momement qe deshironi.

Une do t'ju kontaktoj perseri ne ditet e ardhshme. Nderkohe, ne qofte se keni ndonje pyetje apo shqetesim, ju lutem me kontaktoni ne Nr. e telefonit 313-516-9633 ose achanlin@wayne.edu. Une me te vertete mezi po pres te flas me ju dhe shpresoj qe te jeni te pranishem.

Faleminderit per konsideraten.

Sinqerisht,

Amanda Hanlin

WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

[BOSNIAN]

Draga Sir/Madam,

Kao doktorski kandidat na Wayne State University (WSU) Odsjek političkih nauka, ja provodim studije u cilju boljeg razumijevanja političkih gledišta pojedinaca rođenih izvan Sjedinjenih Američkih Država i njihovog političkog sudjelovanja ovdje i u inostranstvu. Ja prikupljam istraživačke informacije intervjuisanjem pojedinaca koji su se doselili u Detroit Metropolitan iz drugih zemalja.

Vaša uvid u ova pitanja je važan, te se nadam da ću Vas uključiti kao sudionika u ovoj studiji. Željela bih zakazati intervju s Vama na mjestu po Vašem izboru. Intervju će trajati otprilike trideset minuta i bez ikakvih finansijskih troškova za Vas. Vaši odgovori tokom intervjuja će biti potpuno povjerljivi i prikupljeni samo za istraživačke svrhe. Vaše sudjelovanje u ovoj studiji je dobrovoljno i možete se povući u bilo koje vrijeme.

Ponovo ću Vas kontaktirati u roku od nekoliko sljedećih dana. U međuvremenu, ako imate bilo kakvih pitanja ili nedoumica, kontaktirajte me direktno na 313-516-9633 ili

achanlin@wayne.edu. Unaprijed se radujem razgovoru s Vama i nadam se da mogu računati na

Vaše sudjelovanje.

S poštovanjem,

Amanda Hanlin

WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

Research Study Recruitment Flyer

Title of Study: *Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants*

Purpose:

This is a research study that seeks to learn more about how families from other countries adjust to living in the United States. Specifically, we are interested in understanding more about U.S. immigrants' civic and political behavior.

Who is doing the study?

The Principal Investigator for this study is Amanda Hanlin. She is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science at Wayne State University. She can be reached at 313-555-1212 or myemailaddress@wayne.edu.

Who is sponsoring the study?

This study is being conducted at Wayne State University. The study is not funded, and it is being done for the purposes of completing a doctoral dissertation.

Why am I being asked to participate?

You are being asked to participate because you are an adult over the age of 18 who relocated to the United States from another country.

Why should I participate?

As a participant in this research study there will be no direct benefit to you, and you will not be paid to participate. However, information from this study may benefit other people by creating new knowledge about how foreign-born people adjust to life in the United States and the special needs and challenges they have when participating in political systems here and in their home country. There are no known risks to you in participating, and there is no cost to participate. Your identity will be kept strictly confidential, and you will only be identified by a code name or number.

What am I being asked to do?

If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60 minute in-person interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student. The student will interview you at a location of your choice, and she will ask questions about your political participation habits in the United States and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time.

How Can I Get Involved?

If you are willing to participate, or if you know others who may be willing to participate, please contact Amanda Hanlin at (313) 555-1212 or myemailaddress@wayne.edu.

Thank you for your assistance with this important research study!

**WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY**
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

Ftese rekrutimi per nje studim kerkimor

Titulli i Studimit: Sjellja reth Politikes Nderkombetare midis te ardhurve nga Diaspora

Qellimi: Ky eshte nje studim kerkimor qe ka per qellim te mesoje me shume se si familjet e ardhura nga vende te tjera pershtaten me jeten ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes. Ne vecanti, ne jemi te interesuar te kuptojme me shume per jeten qytetare dhe sjelljen politike te emigranteve Amerikane.

Kush po e ben kete studim?

Studiuesi kryesor ne kete studim eshte Amanda Hanlin. Ajo eshte nje Kandidate per doktorature ne Departamentin e Shkencave Politike ne Universitetin Wayne State. Ajo mund te gjendet ne numrin e telefonit **313-555-1212 ose myemailaddress@wayne.edu.**

Kush e sponsorizon kete studim?

Ky studim bo zhvillohet ne Universitetin Wayne State. Per kete studim nuk ka fonde, dhe po behet me qellim per kompletimin e tezes te doktoratures.

Perse po me kerkohet te marr pjese?

Juve po ju kerkohet qe te merrni pjese sepse ju jeni mbi moshen 18 vjet, dhe keni ardhur ne Amerike nga nje vend tjeter.

Perse duhet te marr pjese?

Si nje pjesemarrjes ne kete studim ju nuk do te keni asnje perfitim direct, dhe ju nuk do te paguheni qe te merrni pjese. Megjithate, informacioni nga ky studim mund te jete me vlere per njerez te tjere, te lindur ne vende jashte Amerikes, duke krijuar njohuri te reja reth pershtatjes te emigranteve ne Amerike dhe pjesemarrjes te tyre ne systemet politike Amerikane dhe vendit prej nga ata kane ardhur. Nuk ka asnje rrezik te njohur ne lidhje me pjesemarrjen tuaj, dhe nuk do te keni asnje detyrim financiar per pjesemarrjen tuaj ne kete studim. Identiteti tuaj do te rruhet rreptesisht, dhe ju do te identifikoheni me nje emer te koduar ose me nje numer.

Cfare po me kerkohet te bej?

Ne qofte se bini dakord te merrni pjese ne kete studim kerkimor, do te ju kerkohet te merrni pjese ne nje interviste personale me nje student nga Universiteti Wayne State, qe do te zgjase per rreth 30-60 minuata. Studenti do ju intervistojte ne nje vend te zjedhur prej jush, dhe do tju beje pyetje rreth menyres qe merrni pjese ne politike ne Shtetet e Bashkuara te Amerikes dhe ne vendin e origjines suaj. Ju nuk jeni te detyruar aspak qe ti pergjigjeni asnje pyetjeje qe nuk deshironi, dhe mund ta mbyllni intervisten ne cdo moment.

Si mundem te marr pjese?

Ne qofte se deshironi te merrni pjese, ose ne qofte se njihni te tjere qe kane deshire te marrin pjese, ju lutem kontaktoni Amanda Hanlin ne **313-555-1212 ose myemailaddress@wayne.edu.**

Ju faleminderit per ndihmen tuaj ne kete studim kerkimor te rendesishem!

WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
AND SCIENCES

Naucno-istrazivacki upitnik

Tema: Promjene u politickom ponasanju medju imigrantima u dijaspori

Cilj istrazivanja:

Ovo istazivanje ima za cilj da ustanovi kako se porodice proijeklom iz drugih zemalja prilagodjavaju zivotu u SAD. Poseban cilj je bolje upoznavnje drustvenog i politickog ponasanja imiganata u SAD.

Ko sprovodi ovo istrazivanje?

Glavni istrazivac je Amanda Hanlin, kadidat za doktora nauka na odjeljenju za politicke nauke na Wayne State Univezitetu. Njen kontakt tlefon je (313) 555-1212, myemailaddress@wayne.edu.

Ko finansira istrazivanje?

Istrazivanje se provodi u sklopu nastavnog programa na Wayne State Univerzitetu. Studija nema finansijsku potporu, vec je dio doktorske disertacije kandidata Amande Hanlin.

Zasto vas pozivamo da ucestrvujete u ovom isttazivanju?

Vi ste zamoljeni da ucestrvujete u ovom istrazivanju jer ste odrasla osoba starija od 18 godina koja je imigrirala u SAD iz druge zemlje.

Zasto treba da ucestrvujete u ovom istrazivanju?

Iako necete biti placeni da ucestrvujete u ovom istrazivanju, informacije prikupljene u toku ovog istrazivanja ce rezultirati u prikupljanju znanja o ljudima rodjenim izvan SAD i njihovim specificnim potrebama i izazovima sa kojima se susrecu u ostvarenju svojih politickih prava i obaveza u SAD i u njihovim zemljama porijekla.. Ovo istraivanje je anonimno, i identitet ucesnika u ovom istrazivanju je zasticen. Svi odgovori ce biti oznaceni sifrom.

Sta se ocekuje od vas?

Ukoliko pristanete da ucestrvujete u ovom istrazivanju, ucestvovacete u 30-60 minutnom razgovoru sa kandidatom za doktora nauka, Amandom Hanlin.

Razgovor ce biti obavljen na lokaciji koju vi odaberete. Ona ce vam postavljati pitanja o vasem ucescu u politickom procesu u SAD i u vasioj zemlji porijekla. Ne morate odgovoriti na pitanja koja ne zelite da odgovorite i mozete prekinuti razgovor kad god zazelite.

Kako se mozete ukljuciti u ovaj projekat?

Ukoliko ste zainteresovani da ucestrvujete u ovom istrazivanju ili znate nekoga ko je zainteresovan za isti, molim Vas da uspostavite kontakt sa **Amandom Hanlin na telefon (313) 555-1212, myemailaddress@wayne.edu.**

Unaprijed se zahvaljujemo na pomoci u ovom istrazivanju!

Appendix E – Participant Information Sheet

Research Information Sheet

Title of Study: *Transnational Political Behavior among Diasporic Migrants*

Principal Investigator (PI): Amanda Hanlin
Wayne State University, Political Science
313-555-1212
myemailaddress@wayne.edu

Purpose

You are being asked to be in a research study of civic and political behavior among U.S. immigrants because you relocated to the United States from another country. This study is being conducted at Wayne State University. The estimated number of study participants to be enrolled at Wayne State University is about sixty (60). Please read this form and ask any questions you may have before agreeing to be in the study.

In this research study, you are being asked to participate in an in-person interview with a Doctoral student from Wayne State University. This study is being conducted with the hope of better understanding political participation. These interviews are a chance for individuals to tell us about their involvement in political and civic activities. The purpose of the interview is to help us better understand how international migrants might participate politically in affairs in the United States as well as their country of origin.

Study Procedures

If you agree to take part in this research study, you will be asked to participate in one 30-60 minute in-person interview with a Wayne State University doctoral student.

The student will report to a location of your choice for one 30-60 minute interview.

There will only be one interview, lasting 30-60 minutes.

The student will ask you questions about your political participation habits in the United States and your country of origin. You do not have to answer any interview questions that you do not want to answer, and you may conclude the interview at any time.

Your responses will be kept completely confidential, meaning we will not share your name with anyone. Your interview responses will not be linked with your identity in any way.

Benefits

As a participant in this research study, there will be no direct benefit for you; however, information from this study may benefit other people now or in the future.

Risks

There are no known risks at this time to participation in this study.

Study Costs

Participation in this study will be of no cost to you.

Compensation

You will not be paid for taking part in this study.

Confidentiality

All information collected about you during the course of this study will be kept confidential. You will be identified in the research records by a code name or number. There will be no list that links your identity with this code.

Voluntary Participation/Withdrawal

Taking part in this study is voluntary. You have the right to choose not to take part in this study. If you decide to take part in the study you can later change your mind and withdraw from the study. You are free to only answer questions that you want to answer. You are free to withdraw from participation in this study at any time. Your decisions will not change any present or future relationship with Wayne State University or its affiliates, or other services you are entitled to receive.

Questions

If you have any questions about this study now or in the future, you may contact Amanda Hanlin or one of at the following phone number 313-555-1212. If you have questions or concerns about your rights as a research participant, the Chair of the Human Investigation Committee can be contacted at (313) 577-1628. If you are unable to contact the research staff, or if you want to talk to someone other than the research staff, you may also call (313) 577-1628 to ask questions or voice concerns or complaints.

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

By completing the interview, you are agreeing to participate in this study.

Appendix F - Human Investigation Committee (HIC) Documents

**WAYNE STATE
UNIVERSITY**

HUMAN INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
101 East Alexandrine Building
Detroit, Michigan 48201
Phone: (313) 577-1628
FAX: (313) 993-7122
<http://hic.wayne.edu>



NOTICE OF EXPEDITED APPROVAL

To: Amanda Hanlin
Center Urban Studies
3040 FAB

From: Ellen Barton, Ph.D. 
Chairperson, Behavioral Institutional Review Board (B3)

Date: April 10, 2009

RE: HIC #: 039609B3E

Protocol Title: Transnational Political Behavior Among Diasporic Migrants

Sponsor:

Protocol #: 0903006962

Expiration Date: April 09, 2010

Risk Level/Category: 45 CFR 46.404 - Research not involving greater than minimal risk

The above-referenced protocol and items listed below (if applicable) were **APPROVED** following *Expedited Review* (Category 7*) by the Chairperson/designee for the Wayne State University Behavioral Institutional Review Board (B3) for the period of 04/10/2009 through 04/09/2010. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals that may be required.

- Recruitment Flyer (English version, Bosnian version, and Back Translation)
- Information Sheet (dated 4/7/09 - English version, Bosnian version, and Back Translation)

- Federal regulations require that all research be reviewed at least annually. You may receive a "Continuation Renewal Reminder" approximately two months prior to the expiration date; however, it is the Principal Investigator's responsibility to obtain review and continued approval *before* the expiration date. Data collected during a period of lapsed approval is unapproved research and can *never* be reported or published as research data.
- All changes or amendments to the above-referenced protocol require review and approval by the HIC **BEFORE** implementation.
- Adverse Reactions/Unexpected Events (AR/UE) must be submitted on the appropriate form within the timeframe specified in the HIC Policy (<http://www.hic.wayne.edu/hicpol.html>).

NOTE:

1. Upon notification of an impending regulatory site visit, hold notification, and/or external audit the HIC office must be contacted immediately.
2. Forms should be downloaded from the HIC website at *each* use.

*Based on the Expedited Review List, revised November 1998

REFERENCES

- Al-Ali, N., R. Black, et al. (2001). "The limits to 'transnationalism': Bosnian and Eritrean refugees in Europe as emerging transnational communities." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(4): 576-600.
- Alba, R. and V. Nee (1997). "Rethinking assimilation theory for a new era of immigration." *International Migration Review* 31(4): 826-849.
- Ballinger, P. (2003). *History in exile: Memory and identity at the borders of the Balkans*. Princeton, Princeton University Press.
- Basch, L., N. Glick Schiller, et al. (1994). *Nations Unbound*. Amsterdam, Gordon and Breach.
- Baubock, R. (2003). "Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 700-723.
- Baubock, R. (2005). "Expansive Citizenship: Voting Beyond Territory and Membership." *P.S. Political Science and Politics* 38(4): 683-687.
- Baubock, R., B. Perching, et al., Eds. (2007). *Citizenship Policies in the New Europe*. Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.
- Baubock, R. and J. Rundell (1998). *Blurred Boundaries: Migration, Ethnicity, Citizenship*. Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing Limited.

- Berezin, M. and M. Schain (2003). *Europe without Borders: Remapping Territory, Citizenship, and Identity in a Transnational Age*. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Bloch, A. and C. Levy, Eds. (1999). *Refugees, Citizenship, and Social Policy in Europe*. Basingstoke, Macmillan.
- Bose, S. (2002). *Bosnia after Dayton: Nationalist partition and international intervention*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Brenner, N. (1999). "Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and geographical scale in globalization studies." *Theory and Society* 28: 39-78.
- Brubaker, R. (1992). *Citizenship and nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, R. (1996). *Nationalism reframed: nationhood and the national question in the new Europe*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Campbell, D.T. and Stanley, J.C. (1963) *Experimental and Quasi-experimental Designs for Research*. Houghton Mifflin, Boston, MA.
- Cesarani, D. and M. Fulbrook (1996). *Citizenship, nationality, and migration in Europe*. New York, Routledge.
- Christensen, L.B. (2001) *Experimental Methodology*, Allyn and Bacon, Needham Heights, MA.
- Clifford, J. (1994). "Diasporas." *Cultural Anthropology* 9(3): 302-338.

Coughlan, R. and Owens-Manley, J. (2006) *Bosnian Refugees in America: New Communities, New Cultures*. Utica, New York: Springer.

Diasporas Author(s): James Clifford Source: *Cultural Anthropology*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Further Inflections: Toward Ethnographies of the Future (Aug., 1994), pp. 302-338

Cresswell, J. (2009) *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative and Mixed Methods Approaches*. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, CA.

The Ethnography of Transnational Social Activism: Understanding the Global as Local Practice Author(s): Hilary Cunningham Source: *American Ethnologist*, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Aug., 1999), pp. 583-604

Dayal, S. (1996). "Diaspora and Double Consciousness." *The Journal of the Midwest Modern Language Association* 29(1): 46-62.

Donais, T. (2005). *The Political Economy of Peacebuilding in Post-Dayton Bosnia*. New York, Routledge.

Drainville, A. (1998). *The Fetishism of Global Civil Society: Global Governance, Transnational Urbanism, and Sustainable Capitalism in the World Economy. Transnationalism from Below*. M. P. Smith and L. Guarnizo. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.

Faist, T. (2000). "Transnationalism in International Migration: Implications for the study of citizenship and culture." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 23(2): 189-222.

Faist, T. (2000). *The volume and dynamics of international migration and transnational social spaces*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

- Faist, T., J. Gerdes, et al. (2004). "Dual Citizenship as a Path-Dependent Process." *International Migration Review* 38(3).
- Field, A. (2009) *Discovering Statistics Using SPSS*. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.
- Geddes, A. (2006). *The politics of migration and immigration in Europe*. New York, Routledge.
- Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
- Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, et al., Eds. (1992). *Towards a Transnational Perspective on Migration: Race, class, ethnicity, and nationalism reconsidered*. New York, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences.
- Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, et al. (1992). Transnationalism: A new analytic framework for understanding migration. *Towards a transnational perspective on migration: Race, class, and ethnicity reconsidered*. N. Glick Schiller, L. Basch and C. Szanton-Blanc. New York, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences. 645.
- Glick Schiller, N., L. Basch, et al. (1995). "From immigrant to transmigrant: Theorizing Transnational Migration." *Anthropological Quarterly* 68(1): 48-63.
- Glick Schiller, N. and G. Fouron (1998). *Transnational Lives and National Identities: The Identity Politics of Haitian Immigrants*. *Transnationalism from Below*. M. P. Smith and L. Guarnizo. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.
- Goldring, L. (1998). *The Power of Status in Transnational Social Fields*. *Transnationalism from Below*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.

Guarnizo, L., A. Portes, et al. (2003). "Assimilation and Transnationalism: Determinants of Transpolitical Action Among Contemporary Migrants." *American Journal of Sociology* 108(6): 1211-1248.

Hamilton, L.C. (1992) *Regression with Graphics: A Second Course in Applied Statistics*, Duxbury Press, Belmont, CA.

Hobsbawm, E. (1990). *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Hockenos, P. (2003). *Homeland Calling: Exile Patriotism and the Balkan Wars*. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Kearney, M. (1991). "Borders and boundaries of state and self at the end of an empire." *Journal of Historical Sociology* 5(1): 52-74.

Kearney, M. (1995). "The Local and the Global: The Anthropology of Globalization and Transnationalism." *Annual Review of Anthropology*, 24: 547-565.

Kelly, L. (2003). "Bosnian refugees in Britain: Questioning Community." *Sociology* 37(1): 35-49.

King, C. and M. Neal (1999-2000). "Diaspora Politics: Ethnic Linkages, Foreign Policy, and Security in Eurasia." *International Security* 24(3): 108-138.

Kivisto, P. (2001). "Theorizing transnational immigration: A critical review of current efforts." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 24(4): 549-577.

- Kofman, E. (2002). "Contemporary European Migrations, Civic Stratification and Citizenship." *Political Geography* 21(8): 1035-1054.
- Laguerre, M. (2005). "Homeland Political Crisis, the Virtual Diasporic Public Sphere, and Diasporic Politics." *Journal of Latin American Anthropology* 10(1): 206-225.
- Laguerre, M. (2006). *Diaspora, Politics, and Globalization*. Gordonsville, Palgrave Macmillan.
- International Perspectives on Transnational Migration: An Introduction Author(s): Peggy Levitt, Josh DeWind, Steven Vertovec Source: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, Transnational Migration: International Perspectives (Fall, 2003), pp. 565-575 Published by: The Center for Migration
- Linklater, A. (1996). "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State." *European Journal of International Relations* 2: 77-103.
- Mahler, S. (1998). *Theoretical and Empirical Contributions Toward a Research Agenda for Transnationalism*. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.
- Marshall, T. H. (1950). *Citizenship and Social Class*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
- Marshall, T. H. and T. Bottomore (1992). *Citizenship and Social Class*. Concord, Pluto Press.
- Marx, K. (1845). *The Communist Manifesto*.

- Mearsheimer, J. (2001). *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York, W.W. Norton & Company.
- Morawska, E. (2000) *Intended and Unintended Consequences of Forced Migrations: A Neglected Aspect of East Europe's Twentieth Century History* Author(s): Source: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Winter, 2000), pp. 1049-1087
- Nye, J. (2002). *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Nye, J. (2003). *The Paradox of American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone*. Oxford, Oxford University Press.
- Nedim Ogelman *The International Migration Review*; Spring 2003; 37, 1; Research Library. pg. 163
- Ong, A. (1999). *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality*. Durham, Duke University Press.
- Orozco, M. *The Salvadoran diaspora: remittances, transnationalism and government responses*, Tomas Rivera Policy Institute.
- Østergaard-Nielson, E. (2003). *International Migration and Sending Countries: Key Issues and Themes*. *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*. E. Østergaard-Nielson. New York, Palgrave MacMillan: 3-30.
- Østergaard-Nielson, E., Ed. (2003). *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Politics and International Relations*. New York, Palgrave Macmillan.

- Østergaard-Nielson, E. (2003). "The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 760-786.
- Østergaard-Nielson, E. (2003). *Transnational Politics: Turks and Kurds in Germany*. New York, Routledge.
- Pallant, J. (2005) *SPSS Survival Manual*. McGraw Hill, Berkshire, UK.
- Adrian D. Pantoja , *Transnational Ties and Immigrant Political Incorporation: The Case of Dominicans in Washington Heights, New York*, *International Migration* Vol. 43 (4) 2005
- Pollock III, P. (2005) *An SPSS Companion to Political Analysis*. Washington, DC, CQ Press.
- Portes, A. (1999). "Conclusion: Towards a new world - the origins and effects of transnational activities." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 463-477.
- Portes, A., L. Guarnizo, et al. (1999). "The study of transnationalism: pitfalls and promise of an emergent research field." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 217-237.
- Portes, A. and R. Rumbaut (1990). *Immigrant America: A Portrait*. Berkeley, University of California Press.
- Povrzanović Frykman, M. (ed). (2001) *Beyond Integration: Challenges of belonging in diaspora and exile*. Nordic Academic Press, Sweden.
- Ratha, D., S. Mohapatra, et al. (2008). *Remittance flows to developing countries, 2002-2007 (\$ billion)*. Revision to *Remittance Trends*, The World Bank.

- Sassen, S., Ed. (1998). *Globalization and its Discontents*. The Blackwell City Reader. Oxford, Blackwell Publishing.
- Smith, M. P. and L. Guarnizo (1998). *The Location of Transnationalism. Transnationalism from Below*. M. P. Smith and L. Guarnizo. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.
- Smith, M. P. and L. Guarnizo (1998). *Transnationalism from below*. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Publishers.
- Smith, R. C. (1998). Reflections on migration, the state, and the construction, duration and newness of transnational life. *Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. L. Pries, Ashgate Publishers.
- Smith, R. C. (1998). *Transnational Localities: Community, Tehnology, and the Politics of Membership within the Context of Mexico and U.S. Migration*. *Transnationalism from Below*. M. P. Smith and L. Guarnizo. New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers. 6.
- Robert C Smith *The International Migration Review*; Summer 2003; 37, 2; Research Library. pg. 297
- Soysal, Y. N. (1994). *Limits of Citizenship*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.
- Szanton-Blanc, C., L. Basch, et al. (1995). "Transnationalism, Nation-States and Culture." *Current Anthropology* 36(4): 683-686.
- Tashakkori, A. and Teddlie, C. (1998) *Mixed Methodology: Combining Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches*. Applied Social Research Methods Series, Volume 46. Sage Publications. Thousand Oaks, CA.

Trix, F. (2001). *The Albanians in Michigan*. East Lansing, Michigan State University Press.

Ümit Necef, M. (2001) *The Renegades and Remote-Controlled: The Turkish Debate on the National Allegiance of the Turkish Immigrants in Germany*. In Frykman.

Vertovec, S. (2003) *Migration and Other Modes of Transnationalism: Towards Conceptual Cross-Fertilization*, Source: *International Migration Review*, Vol. 37, No. 3, *Transnational Migration: International Perspectives* (Fall, 2003), pp. 641-665

Vertovec, S. (1999). "Conceiving and researching transnationalism." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2): 447-460.

Vertovec, S. and C. Robin, Eds. (1999). *Migration, diasporas, and transnationalism*. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.

Between "Here" and "There": Immigrant Cross-Border Activities and Loyalties

Roger Waldinger *The International Migration Review*; Spring 2008; 42, 1; Research Library

Wallerstein, I. (1974). *The Modern World System: Capitalis Agriculture adn teh Origins of the European World Economy in the Sixteenth Century*. New York, Academic Press.

Weiss, T. (1999) *Whither International Efforts for Internally Displaced Persons?* *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 36, No. 3. (May, 1999), pp. 363-373.

Westin, C. (2001) *Approaches to the study of exile and traumatization*. In Frykman.

Wimmer, A. and N. Glick Schiller (2003). "Methodological Nationalism, the Social Sciences, and the Study of Migration: An Essay in Historical Epistemology." *International Migration Review* 37(3): 576-610.

Wood, W. B. (1994). "Forced Migration: Local Conflicts and International Dilemmas." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 84(4): 607-634.

Yin, R. (1994) *Case Study Research: Design and Methodology*. Applied Social Science Research Methods Series, Volume 5. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA.

ABSTRACT

TRANSNATIONAL PARTICIPATION AMONG DIASPORIC MIGRANTS

by

Amanda Hanlin

December 2010

Advisor: Dr. Kevin Deegan-Krause

Major: Political Science

Degree: Doctor of Philosophy

Contemporary migrants participate in a variety of dual social, political, and economic processes. Sending and receiving states overtly encourage transnational practices when they allow migrants to maintain homeland citizenship regardless of their citizenship status in their receiving communities. Yet, we know little about migrants' ability to enact their citizenship and their propensity to participate in sending and receiving state networks and structures. We know also that diasporas experience and shape transnational spaces differently than other migrants, but we have much to learn about what influences a diaspora's desire and ability to maintain a political affiliation with their homeland and to become politically incorporated in their receiving community

What does having a transnational existence mean for a diaspora's desire and ability to become politically active? Do diasporas have opportunities to act within

networks in one or both of their affiliated communities? And if opportunities are present, do they seek to participate or to withdraw? I approach transnationalism as a site of dual-state and extra-state political engagement, and examine how differences in sending conditions hold political significance for the individual, the community, and the state. I gathered data via face-to-face interviews with forty participants – Albanians, Bosnians and Kosovars who migrated to the United States in 1995 or later. I measured type, mode and frequency of transnational political activity and assigned scores to a spectral typology of action, including: avoidance, awareness, engagement and activism. Within this, I observe how transnational political activity is influenced by various independent variables.

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL STATEMENT

Amanda Hanlin is a free-lance writer. She has written ad copy, feature and op-ed journalism, grants, Presidential letters and messages, and academic articles. She has authored many articles about Detroit in particular, including pieces about its biker gangs, jazz clubs, homeless entrepreneurs, shopkeepers, barbacks, artists, psychics, politicians, disc jockeys, and musicians. Although she has never won any awards for her writing, Hanlin recently won \$1000 in a raffle. It was quite a surprise. She spent most of it on shoes and beer. She received a Bachelor of Arts degree in International Relations from Michigan State University, and a Master of Arts degree in Political Science from Wayne State University. She earned her doctorate preparing a dissertation regarding the transnational political effects of interstate migration. Previously, Dr. Hanlin worked as a courier, waitress, horticulturalist, health care lobbyist, White House staff writer, urban studies researcher, IT project manager, commercial actress and shoe salesperson. She regrets deeply having never been a spy or a marine biologist. Dr. Hanlin loves travel and was last observed mountain biking through rural China, and she hopes to visit Cambodia and Argentina in the coming year.